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RÉSUMÉ 
Le but de ce mémoire de maîtrise est de réexaminer le conflit constitutionnel sur la Charte 
canadienne des droits et libertés entre le Québec et le gouvernement fédéral canadien. À cet 
effet, les différences entre les conceptions des droits tenues par les politiciens et intellectuels 
au Québec et par les autres gouvernements au Canada, en particulier par le gouvernement 
fédéral canadien, seront examinées. 
Depuis l' adoption de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1982, il y a eu un fossé persistant entre le 
Québec et le reste du Canada. À notre avis, ce fossé résulte de la différence de points de vue 
quant aux « droits » qui devraient être reconnus. Ainsi, là où la société québécoise semble 
considérer les droits comme issus de la collectivité, le reste du Canada envisage ces droits 
sous un angle individualiste libéral. Pierre E. Trudeau, l'architecte de la Charte canadienne, a 
fondé sa conception du droit sur l'individualisme libéral, et s' est donc opposé à la politique 
linguistique du Québec. Contrairement à l'opinion de Trudeau voulant que la société 
québécoise soit illibérale, Charles Taylor a essayé de combler le fossé entre les deux sociétés, 
en reconnaissant que la société québécoise est une société certes différente, mais libérale. 
Cette divergence de vues relativement à l' origine des droits a influencé la conscience des 
Canadiens, persuadés de la nature collectiviste de la société québécoise. Ainsi, la 
perçoivent-ils non seulement comme étant différente, mais également comme pouvant 
restreindre leur liberté individuelle. Cependant, un tel présupposé est-il un point de départ 
approprié pour discuter des différences entre le Québec et le reste du Canada ? 
Pour répondre à cette question, nous souhaitons reconsidérer ce débat à la lumière des 
discussions intergouvernementales qui ont précédé et accompagné le rapatriement de 1982 et 
clarifier la signification du fédéralisme multinational canadien en recourant principalement à 
une perspective de recherche historique. Nous souhaitons ainsi montrer le caractère dualiste 
de la conception des droits par les gouvernements et intellectuels québécois, en ce qu ' elle est 
à la fois individualiste et collective, et non strictement collectiviste comme certains l'ont 
prétendu. 
SUMMARY 
The purpose of this paper is to reconsider the constitutional conflict over the Canadian 
Charter ofRights and Freedoms between Quebec and Canada by examining the differences in 
the conceptions of rights between Que bec and the rest of Canada. 
Since the enactment of the 1982 constitution, there has been the di vide between Quebec 
and the rest of Canada. In my opinion, this divide results from the dichotomy in the 
perspective viewpoints on what "rights" should be recognized, namely where Quebecois 
society views rights as originating in collective society, whereas the rest of Canada views 
them from a liberal individualistic frame. Pierre Trudeau, the founder of the Charter, based 
his conception of rights on liberal individualism and thus opposed to the Quebec language 
policy. Unlike Trudeau' s opinion that Quebec society is illiberal, Charles Taylor tried to 
bridge the two societies, recognizing that Quebecois society is a different but liberal society. 
However, this dichotomy has intluenced the consciousness of English speaking peoples, 
where they have come to view the collective nature of Quebecois society as not just different, 
but as potentially as a constraining influence over their individual liberty. However, is such a 
dichotomy really an appropriate starting point for discussing differences between Quebec and 
the rest of Canada? 
Therefore, 1 would like to reconsider this dichotomy in order to clarify the 
significance of multinational federalism by focusing my examination on the constitutional 
conflict between Canada and Quebec surrounding the Canadian Charter through historical 
research because the multinational federalism often is recognized as the system defending the 
collective society such as the Quebecois society by English Canadians. Alternatively, in this 
master thesis I would like to point out that govemments and intellectuals in Quebec shared a 
conception of rights which is both individual and collective, and not strictly collectivist as 
many asserted. 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this thesis is to reconsider the constitutional con:flict over the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms between the Québec and the federal governments 
by examining the differences in the conceptions of rights held by politicians and intellectuals 
in Québec and in the other provincial and federal governments. Since 1967, Prime Minister 
Pierre Elliott Trudeau has sought to form a federal system based on the principle of a national 
State. In contrast to this, tbere was the argument by academies such as Kenneth McRoberts1 
and Alain-G. Gagnon, that a multinational federal system is suitable for the Canadian 
political system because, from the beginning, Canada (and especially Québec) was a 
multinational State composed of the English, the French, and aboriginal nations. Therefore, in 
our understanding, the conflict, which has existed weil before the establishment of the 
Constitution Act, 1982 has been centered on a fundamental disagreement regarding two 
visions of federalism: between a territorial and symmetrical federation based on a national 
state, and a multinational federation. However, in order to examine the constitutive 
differences underpinning these political systems, it is necessary to move the discussion to 
deeper aspects of legal and normative consciousness backing these conceptions about 
federations, that is, legal and rights ethos. ln order to understand the aspects of these ethos 
1 Kenneth McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity (Toronto: 
Oxford University Press, 1997). Alain-G. Gagnon, La Raison du plus fort: Plaidoyer pour le 
fédéralisme multinational (Montreal: Québec Amérique, 2008). 
2 
more clearly, it is necessary to study the disputes about conceptions of rights regarding the 
entrenchrnent of the Canadian Charter. In analyzing these disputes, important differences 
between Trudeau and the Québec premiers become evident. ln the following sections we 
would like to state the purpose of this thesis in more detail. 
In Canadian constitutional history, it is often said that the constitutional reforms of 
1982 was an important tuming point in the history of the Canadian political system because it 
determined the character and purpose of the Canadian State on the principle of 
individualism. 2 The 1982 Constitutional reform introduced two cri ti cal elements: the 
entrenchment of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and a new formula for Constitutional 
amendment. The Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees fondamental freedoms such as 
the freedom of thought, democratie rights such as the right to vote, legal rights, which aim 
mainly at the protection of individual rights in criminal proceedings and equality rights . ln 
these provisions of the Charter, Trudeau' s brand of liberal individualism is evident. 
Conceming the general formula for amending the Canadian Constitution, the approval of 
seven provinces representing at !east 50 % of the population of ali provinces is stipulated as 
being enough for most of reform items, meaning that Québec is not able to wield veto power 
over proposed constitutional reforms, except when unanimity or bilateral agreement are 
2 Guy Laforest, Trudeau and the End of a Canadian Dream (Montreal/Kingston: 
McGiii-Queen' s University Press, 1995), 135-139. Eugénie Brouillet, La Négation de la 
Nation (Sillery: Éditions du Septentrion, 2005), 381. 
3 
required. Although there was Honoré Mercier who espoused the theory of a pact betweeo the 
provinces regarding interpretation of the "Confederation", Québec governments have claimed 
that Québec should have the right to veto powers on the ground that the Confederation was 
formed by a pact between the two founding peoples/ the Eoglish and French Canadiao 
peoples, but this claim was not reflected in the Canadian Charter. 
Moreover, in 1982, the Constitution was enacted along with the Canadian Charter 
without the consent of Québec. From the middle of 1980's to early 1990's there were sorne 
attempts to break the deadlock of this constitutional problern because the political situation 
was changed both in federal and Québec politics. In federal politics, the Conservatives of 
Brian Mulroney replaced the govemment of the Liberais. Mulroney sought to tackle the 
constitutional problem with a positive attitude because he wanted to get more votes in 
Québec on the federal election. In Québec politics, the government was changed from the 
Parti Québécois of René Lévesque to the Parti Libéral of Robert Bourassa. While insistiog 
that he espouses federalism, Bourassa proposed five conditions such as the recognition of 
Québec's status as a distinct society, under which Québec accepts the 1982 Constitution. ln 
1987, the discussions between Mulroney and ali provincial premiers on Meech Lake resulted 
in the Meech Lake Accord meeting Québec's five demands. However, most of English 
3 Quebec 's Positions on Constitutional and Inter governmental issues from 1936 to March 
2001, http://www.saic.gouv.qc.ca/institutionnelles constitutionnelles/table matieres en.htm, 
13. 
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Canadians was vehemently opposed to the clause of distinct society of the Meech Lake 
Accord on the ground that recognizing the clause means giving the Québec special powers, 
which brings about inequalities between provinces. In the end, since the Meech Lake accord 
wasn ' t ratified in two provincial parliaments until the deadline, it resulted in failure. In 1992, 
the federal govemment proposed aga in a new package of the amendments to the constitution, 
later called Charlottetown Accord. However, the Accord also failed without meeting 
demands ofboth the Québec and the rest ofCanada.4 
After the failure of both Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords for accommodating 
the Québec, the national unity of Canada bas been a central issue for majority of the 
academics.5 The significant question for them is to seek a formula in which 'Canada' can be 
reconceived, and Québec can be re-integrated into the Canadian constitution. Thus, for sorne 
academies, recognizing Canada's multinational character in a new brand of multinational 
federalism bas been a landmark approach in reuniting Canada as it recognizes Québec as 
nation within Canada. 
However, as strong opposition to the distinct society clause in English Canada 
suggests, multinational federalism is opposed by them. In our opinion, this can be explained 
4 Kenneth McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada, op.cit , 190-199. 
5 See, Charles Taylor, "Shared and Divergent Values" m Reconciling the Solitudes 
(Montreal/Kingston: McGiii-Queen's University Press, 1993), and Will Kymlicka, 
Multicultural citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) 
5 
by their fear that the clause of distinct society will clash with the principle of superiority of 
individual rights entrenched in the Canadian Charter. It is Trudeau ' s philosophy that played 
an important role in shaping their views of the Québec society. 
Trudeau himself, as founder of the Charter, has never recognized the particular 
character of ' multinational Canada' because he was a rigid believer in liberal individualism. 
One example would be when he violently objected to the Québec language Act, the Charter 
of the French Language (called Bill 101), which had been enacted by the Parti Québécois 
govemment in 1977 because, according to him, the provision saying that only English parents 
born in Québec can send their children to public English school (section 73, the Charter of 
the French Language) seemed to infringe on individual freedom of choice of language. While 
referring to the phrase of the French thinker Ernest Renan, 'No-one is a slave of history,' 
Trudeau argued from the philosophical position that the community should not make it 
impossible for the individual to change his language, or even citizenship. Trudeau finally 
concluded that the Québec language Act, Bill 101 , was illiberal as it fomented ' aggressive 
nationalism,' namely, nationalism at the expense of the individua1.6 
In recent scholarship, a lot of criticism has been raised against Trudeau's views, 
which we have outlined above. We would like to examine Charles Taylor's arguments for 
multinational federalism, which has been one of the most influential views within these 
6 Cité libre, « Entretien avec Pierre Elliott Trudeau», (vol.26 n° 1,1998), 104-105. 
6 
criticisms. Charles Taylor emphasizes the importance of recognition in politics, as, according 
to him, a crucial feature of human life is its fundamentally dialogical character; the 
foundation of identity requires contribution from others. In the public sphere of modern 
society, the politics of equal recognition necessitate the politics of difference (an individual ' s 
sense of his or her own distinctive identity), in addition to the equal dignity of ali citizens to 
be upheld (the equalization of rights and entitlements) .7 Conflicts between these paradigms 
of thinking are reflected in the context of Canadian politics. Here, according to Taylor, two 
liberal conceptions of rigbts have confronted English Canadians and French Canadians; the 
principle that ali citizen should be treated equally and the principle that demands cultural 
autonomy in the name of collective rights. 
Unlike Trudeau's opinion of Québec society as illiberal, Taylor tried to bridge the 
two societies, recognizing that Québécois society is a different but liberal society. However, 
as Charles Taylor points out, this dichotomy has influenced the consciousness of English 
speaking peoples, where they have come to view the collective nature of Québécois society 
as not just different, but as potentially as a constraining influence over their individual 
liberty.8 However, is such a dichotomy really an appropriate starting point for discussing 
differences between Québec and the rest of Canada? 
7 Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition": An Essay by Charles 
Taylor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 32-38. 
8 Taylor, "Shared and Divergent Values" in Reconciling the Solitudes, op.cit, 173-179. 
7 
Therefore, as the subject of my research, we would like to reconsider this dichotomy 
in order to clarify the significance of multinational federalism by focusing my examination 
on the constitutional conflict between Canada and Québec surrounding the Canadian Charter 
through historical research because multinational federalism often is recognized by English 
Canadians as the system defending the collective aspirations of a society such as the 
Québécois society. Therefore, our research question is: Can we correctly perceive the 
constitutional conflict between Canada and Québec from the dichotomous viewpoint that 
Québécois society has more "collectivist" tendencies, and where the rest of Canada is framed 
as a more "liberal individualistic" society? Alternatively, in this master thesis we would 
like to point out that Québécois society is both individual and collective. For example, 
although a language act normally assumes the form of collective rights, the Québec 
government sought to expand each individual right through the language act. Moreover, each 
individual participates in making the language law through the representative democracy of 
the National Assembly. That is, the language act guarantees that legislative results are 
derived from the choices of individuals. Therefore, a reconsideration of the aforementioned 
conception of Québécois society can further the legitimacy of multinational federalism. 
In this aim, my research is centered mainly on the temporal process by which the 
Canadian Charter of the Rights and Freedoms has been adopted. This is because the conflict 
over the Charter was an ideological one that brought about, among other things, the present 
divided situation between Canada and Québec. The Constitution Act of 1982 was enacted as 
part of a repatriation process (a term which describes the process by which the final 
8 
constitutional authority was "brought home" to Canada from British Parliament) that has 
been occurring since the time of Mackenzie King in 1927. However, since the appearance of 
Trudeau in 1960' s, the meaning of ' repatriation process ' has been re-interpreted to include 
the entrenchment of the Charter of Rights, which implies a radical transformation of 
Canadian federalism. Thus, my research deals with Canadian constitutional history in the 
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s briefly in order to set the context in which the process of repatriation 
by Trudeau took place. Specifically, we will look at periods in which important constitutional 
conferences took place, such as the 1980 and 1981 federal-provincial conferences, because 
the period between 1980 and 1981 federal-provincial conferences was a decisive tuming 
point of the political process leading to the enactment of the Constitution Act of 1982. 
Survey of the literature conceming the Québec question 
Within our research, we refer to prevwus historical and political studies and 
normative analyses about Canada and the Québec question. Firstly, we would like to consider 
previous works that deal with the nature of Canadian federalism and the Québec question in 
general. 
9 
With respect to Canadian constitutional history, seminal works by English speaking 
academies, such as Peter Russell ' s Constitutional Odyssey 9 and Kenneth McRoberts, 
Misconceiving Canada appeared prominently10, but studies by French-speaking academies 
also are found within the literature, among the notable ones: Guy Laforest, Trudeau and the 
end of a Canadian dream, 11 François Rocher "La dynamique Québec- Canada ou le refus de 
l' idéal fédéral,"12 Alain-G. Gagnon and Raffaele Iacovino, Federa/ism, Citizenship, and 
Quebec, 13and Eugénie Brouillet, La Négation de la nation.14 
Peter Russell stresses the ideological transition from Edmund Burkian organic 
constitutionalism to the John Lockean social contract in Canadian constitutional politics. In 
the theory of social contract, sovereignty is attributed to people that forms the constitution. 
Therefore, the question at issue is the definition of national identity, that is, who is the 
Canadian people? The politics for national identity has unfolded (mega constitutional 
politics) on the constitutional agenda. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is the 
9 Peter Russell H, Constitutional Odyssey : Can Canadians become a Sovereign People? 
Third Edition (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004). 
1
° Kenneth McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada, op.cit 
11 Guy Laforest, Trudeau and the End of a Canadian Dream (Montreal/Kingston: 
McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995). 
12 François Rocher, «La dynamique Québec-Canada ou le refus de l'idéal fédéral », dans 
Alain G. Gagnon, (dir.), Le fédéralisme canadien contemporain: Fondements, traditions, 
institutions (Montréal, Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 2006). 
13 Alain-G. Gagnon, and Raffaele Iacovino, Federalism, Citizenship, and Quebec: Debating 
Multinationalism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007). 
14 Brouillet, La Négation de la Nation, op.cit 
10 
foundation of mega constitutional politics.15 Moreover, according to Russell, the political 
purpose of the Charter is to function as a symbol of Canadian nation-building. This is based 
on Trudeau' s vision for a one-nation strategy, which attempts to treat everyone explicitly as 
"Canadian," regardless ofwhat language they speak or which cultural identity they belong to. 
In fact, according to Russell, it is clear that the federal government sought to enact the 
Charter in order to use it as a counterweight to Québec nationalism. 16 As stated above, 
Russell points out the ideological transition of the constitutional politics (from the 
evolutionary development such as the one advocated by Edmund Burke to a single document 
drawn up at a particular point in ti me) and the purpose of the Canadian Charter. However, 
Russell did not insist that Canada should be a multinational State. 
On the other hand, McRoberts insisted that Canada is indeed a multinational State 
and should thus recognize Québec as a nation within the federation . He describes Canadian 
constitutional history focusing on Trudeau's national unity strategy, which envisions a 
Canada composed of rights-bearing individuals. He describes how the promotion of this 
framework of rights brought about the present divide between Canada and Québec. 
According to him, rudeau did not share the traditional French Canadian view of ' compact 
theory' in Canadian federalism, and attempted to unite Canada based on a vision of a single 
15 Russell, Constitutional Odyssey, op.cit., 3-11. 
16 Peter Russell, "The Political purposes of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms," 
Canadian Bar Review 61(1983), 31-35. 
11 
Canadian nation, which was to be built. The hallmark achievement of his persona! philosophy 
was the Constitution Act of 1 982 and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 17 
Laforest also indicates that the enactment of the 1982 constitution puts an end to the 
dualism of French and English Canadians. He examines Trudeau's intention of enacting the 
1982 constitution in particular, and revealed that the purpose of the Canadian Charter was to 
function as a symbol of Canadian nation-building. According to Trudeau, the Canadian 
Charter was the principal stuff in a strategy aimed at binding the Canadian nation together 
against Québec nationalism. 18 Moreover, as to the impact of the Constitution Act of 1982 
and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Laforest primarily constructed his work 
on the foundations of John Locke' s social contract theory, explaining that the Constitution 
and the Charter Jack legitimacy because Trudeau's proposai for the renewal of Canadian 
federalism during the 1980 referendum campaign presumed that trust existed between those 
who govem and those who are govemed. Nevertheless, Trudeau betrayed the trust of the 
people of Québec, which amounted to nothing Jess than a theoretical dissolution of the 
govemment. 19 Therefore, since 1982, in terms of political identity and belonging, Québec 
has not been properly integrated into the new Canada, a period which he terms ' the internai 
17 McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada, op.cit., xi-xvi. 
18 Laforest, Trudeau and the End of a Canadian Dream, op.cit., 125-128. 
19 Ibid., 54-55. 
12 
exile of Quebecers in the Canada of the Charter' ?0 Trudeau made decisive reforms that 
endangered Québec's status through the Constitution Act of 1982. 
According to Gagnon and Iacovino, the important point concerning Canadian 
constitutional history is that Canadian federal government bas not recognized Québec as a 
nation. Therefore, they propose that Québec should adopt for itself a formai constitution that 
would serve as a symbol of Québec's self-determination in order to restart the constitutional 
discussion with the rest ofCanada.21 
On the other hand, François Rocher stresses not only the autonomy of Québec but 
also the requirement of interdependence between the federal government and the Québec 
government, which is a fundamental principle of federalism often overlooked in Québec. 
According to him, federal principles are concerned with the combination of self-rule and 
shared rule. In the Canadian constitutional history, English speaking academies have 
interpreted the federal regime as a highly centralized system, placing emphasis on the 
effectiveness of policies. On the other band, French speaking academies have put emphasis 
on the autonomy of the provinces. However, it is important to take into consideration the 
20 Guy Laforest, 'The internai Exile ofQuebecers in the Canada ofthe Charter,' in James B. 
Kelly and Christopher P. Manfredi, Contested Constitutionalism: Rejlections on the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Vancouver: University of British Colombia 
Press, 2009), 54-55. 
21 Alain-G. Gagnon, and Raffaele Iacovino, Federalism, Citizenship, and Quebec, op. cit., 
166-177. 
13 
principle of interdependence which IS channeled through the multiple mechanisms of 
federal-provincial collaboration.22 
Eugénie Brouillet describes Canadian constitutional history by exarnining how 
Canadian federalism has managed the question of the preservation and promotion of 
Québec's distinct cultural and national identity from 1867 to this day. According to her, from 
1867 to the end of the Second World War, Canadian federalism was relatively generous 
towards the preservation and promotion ofQuébec's culture and identity. However, since the 
second balf of 20th century, this generosity bas gradually eroded through the following two 
steps: beginning at the end of the 1940s, the first step is characterized by the adoption of 
Canadian citizenship, followed by the extension of the Canadian Welfare State through 
spending power, and the second step started with the abolition in 1949 of appeal to the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Since that time, the position of the Supreme Court 
of Canada has been shifting towards an orientation unfavorable to Québec. Y et it was the 
second step which has had a more decisive impact on Québec's pursuit of nationhood. This 
second step began with the repatriation of the Constitution Act of 1982 along with the 
entrenchment of the Charter ofRights and Freedoms. According to Brouillet, this change had 
22 François Rocher, «La dynamique Québec-Canada ou le refus de l'idéal fédéral», 
op.cit ,99-119. 
14 
sorne influence in denying the founding principle of the 1867 Confederation, namely 
plurinationalism.23 
In sum, these academies have paid special attention to the 1982 Constitution and the 
Charter of Rights in Canadian constitutional history concerning the Québec politics. In the 
next section, we would like to examine influence of the Charter on the Québec politics 
throughjudicial rulings in order to clarify more the meaning and legal impact of the Charter. 
Survey of the jurisprudence applying the Canadian Charter to Québec. 
An important effect of the Charter on Canadian poli tics and the "Québec problem" 
is the empowerment of the Canadian judiciary to exert the authority to interpret the Charter 
(with particular reference to Supreme Court Judges)?4 Judicial opinions as rulings are legally 
binding; once they have been made by the Supreme Court, they are very difficult to reverse. 
Charter rul ings are th us framed as part of the constitution, and opposing it would seem to be 
against the principle of freedom and the integrity of individual rights, or any other princip le 
23 Eugénie Brouillet, La Négation de la Nation, op.cit., 380-381. 
24 Frederick L. Morton and Rainer Knopff, The Charter Revolution and the Court Party 
(Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2000), 149-1 50. 
15 
entrenched in the constitution. Moreover, the political influence of judges on Canadian 
federalism is an important part of the court system of Canada that needs to be taken into 
consideration. In this system, ali judges of provincial superior courts, as weil as judges of the 
Supreme Court of Canada are appointed by the federal cabinet. 25 According to Marc 
Chevrier, Québec governments and intellectuals have been opposed to the nomination of 
judges by the federal cabinet and have demanded that a special constitutional court be 
established using the European model. However, Trudeau clearly refused the request of 
Québec on the grounds that it would disrupt the Canadian judicial system and diminish the 
authority of the Supreme Court of Canada?6 
In fact, since the enactment of the 1982 constitution, the rulings of the Supreme 
Court of Canada have been incrementally undermining the autonomy of the National 
Assembly of Québec. For example, judgments such as Québec Protestant School Boards v. 
Québec Attorney General of 198427, Ford v. Québec Attorney General of 198~8, and Devine 
25 Michel Seymour, « L'État fédéré du Québec » dans Jocelyn Maclure et Alain- G.Gagnon, 
Repères en mutation : Identité et citoyenneté dans le Québec contemporain (Montréal: 
Québec Amérique, 2001), 367-368. 
26 Marc Chevrier, «Contrôle judiciaire et gouverne démocratique: de la " législation 
judiciaire" au Canada depuis 1982 »Thèse pour le doctorat de l'institut d'etudes politiques 
de Paris (2000), 47-50. For further details see also, Marc Chevrier, La République 
~uébécoise : Hommages à une idée suspecte (Montréal : Boréal,20 12), 316-318. 
7 A.G. (Que.) v. Quebec Protestant School Boards, [1984]2 S.C.R.66. 
28 Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General) , [1988]2 S.C.R.712. 
,------ ---
16 
v. Québec Attorney General of 198829, are cases by which the powers for the national 
assembly of Québec to preserve its language and culture were diminished. 
In the case of Protestant School Board v. Québec, the clause of the French 
language Act prescribing that only English speaking parents born in Québec bad the right to 
send their children to public English school (section 73, the Charter of the French Language) 
was found to be unjustified under the Canadian Charter prescribing that English or French 
language minority cao have rights to send their child to English or French school (section 23 , 
Constitution Act, 1982).30 In the case of Ford v. Québec, the French language Act (Act 101) 
regarding the exclusive use of French in public signs and commercial advertisements was 
held to be unconstitutional. The issue raised in this case is that the law prescribing the 
exclusive use of French is an unreasonable infringement of freedom of expression, although 
the purposes of the Québec law were regarded as legitimate, i.e. the enhancement of the 
French language within the province. Therefore, it was contended that it restricted 
unnecessarily the freedom of expression prescribed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms (Section 2b) as weil as the Québec Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Section 3).31 
29 Devine v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988]2 S.C.R.790. 
30 A.G. (Que.) v. Quebec Protestant School Boards, [1984]2 S.C.R.66. 
31 The judgment is as follows: The appeal should be dismissed. Sections 58 and 69 of the 
Charter of the French Language, and ss. 205 to 208 thereof to the extent they apply to ss. 58 
and69, infringe s. 3 of the Quebec Charter and are not justified under s. 9.1 of the Quebec 
Charter. Section 69, and ss. 205 to 208 to the extent they apply to s. 69, infringe s. 2(b) of the 
Canadian Charter and are not justified by s. 1 of the Canadian Charter. Sections 58 and 
69infringe s. 10 ofthe Quebec Charter. 
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The Judges ' final ruling was that the joint or predominant use of the French language in 
public signs is allowed.32 In the case of Devine v. Québec, the point at issue was whether the 
Québec French language act was valid provincial law and whether the provisions prohibiting 
English signs violated the right to freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Canadian 
Charter, and if so, could it be saved under section 1 of the Canadian Charter. The judges 
accepted that provisions concerning the public poster of the French language act come und er 
jurisdiction of the province because these provisions were in relation to commerce within the 
province, which was a matter within the provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights 
in the province (section 92(13) Constitution Act, 1867). 33 However, these provisions of the 
French language Act were held unconstitutional because the judges held that the freedom of 
expression guaranteed by the Canadian Charter (section 2b) is infringed not only by a 
prohibition of the use of one' s language of choice but also by a legal requirement compelling 
one to use a particular language. 
As is evident, ali three of the above rulings backed up the principles underlying 
the clauses of the Canadian Charter. What is remarkable regarding this issue cao be read in 
the following remark of the j udges of Supreme Court in the case of Protestant School Board 
v. Québec. 
32 Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988]2 S.C.R.712. 
33 Peter W.Hogg, Constitutional Law ofCanada (Toronto: Carswell,1999), 56-4. 
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The Court cannot accept the argument that the deniai of certain individual rights 
can be justified as a consequence of the limitation of collective rights .34 
The judges state that collective rights cannot limit individual rights. However, in 
our opinion, the very individual rights to which they refer are in fact collective rights because 
they are enacted in the Canadian parliament without the consent of the Québec legislature. 
The Canadian Charter can therefore be said to be collective rights legitimized by Canada 
without Québec. Therefore, the dichotomy of individual rights and collective rights referred 
to in the remarks of the judges may be viewed as too simplistic. The judges in this case 
rejected the appeal of Québec, stating that the Canadian Charter takes legal precedence to the 
French Language Act. These judgments can be considered as damaging to the democratie 
autonomy of the Québec legislature, as weil as damaging to the scope of its abi lity to produce 
binding legislation. 
After the judgment of the case re garding the language of public sign and poster, the 
Québec government used section 33 of the Canadian Charter (the notwithstanding clause) to 
avoid the result of the j udgment. Then the Québec Premier Robert Bourassa used the 
notwithstanding clause to put as ide sorne provisions of the Canadian Charter. This use of the 
notwithstanding clause resulted in provoking ill fee ling among ali Canadians/5 and therefore, 
34 A.G. (Que.) v. Quebec Protestant School Boards, [1984] 2 S.C.R.66, 14. 
35 André Binette,« Le pouvoir dérogatoire de l'article 33 de la Charte canadienne des droits 
et libertés et la structure de la Constitution du Canada», (2003), in Revue du Barreau, Tome 
63 Numéro spécial, 118. 
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the provincial government would from then on be more hesitant in using it.36 As Peter Hogg 
and Bushell Allison point out, section 1 of the Canadian Charter subjects the rights 
guaranteed by the Charter to "sucb reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratie society", but this section is available only 
wh en a case is not against the objective of the Charter.37 Th us, 'the dialogue between courts 
and legislatures' is realized only when a reasonable settlement is reached within the scope of 
the objective of the Charter. In the other cases, 'the dialogue' is extremely restricted. As 
Alain Cairns points out, this has the effect on both the federal and provincial governments. 
However, since the original purpose of the federal government is the application of the 
Canadian values, the federal govemment doesn ' t fee! as unsatisfied as the provincial 
governments with the arrangement.38 On the contrary, the uniform application of the Charter 
is not acceptable for Québec province, as it feels the strong need to maintain its values in 
order to protect its own language and culture. 
36 David Schneiderman, "Human Rights, Fundamental Differences? Multiple Charters in a 
Partnership Frame" in Roger Gibbins and Guy Laforest, Beyond the impasse toward 
reconciliation (1998), IRPP, 156-157. 
37 Peter W. Hogg and Allison A. Bushell, "The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and 
Legislatures" (1997), in Osgoode Hall Law Journal Vol. 35 No.l , 84-94. 
38 Alan C. Cairns, Charter versus Federalism: The Dilemmas of Constitutional Reform 
(1992), McGill Queens University Press, 76-77. 
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The significance of multinational federalism and the research question 
The philosophy underlying the Canadian values at issue in the aforementioned 
argument is the one that Canada is a national state based on liberal individualism. The vision 
of the state is completely different from the vision of multinational state. ln the multinational 
state, each minority nation in the state has the right of nation-building. Michel Seymour states 
that the solution to Canada-Québec question is to protect the culture and language of Québec 
by recognizing that Canada is a multinational State. 39 The view that the Canadian 
constitutional order should be changed from the current Trudeau-style federalism to a new, 
decentralized, multinational federalism bas been shared by sorne Canadian scholars. Recently, 
we have founded this opinion not only in the words of French-speaking analysts such as 
Michel Seymour, François Rocher,40 Réjean Pelletier,41 and Alain-G. Gagnon,42 but also 
among English-speaking scbolars such as Will Kymlicka, Charles Taylor, and Kenneth 
McRoberts. 
39 Michel Seymour« L'État fédéré du Québec», 351-354. See also Michel Seymour, De la 
tolérance à la reconnaissance (Montréal: Boréal, 2008), 558-566. 
4° François Rocher, «La dynamique Québec-Canada ou le refus de l' idéal fédéral ».op.cit 
41 Réjean Pelletier,« L'asymétrie dans une fédération multinationale: le cas canadien» dans 
Linda Cardinal, Le fédéralisme asymétrique et les minorités linguistiques et nationales 
(Sudbury: Éditions Prise de parole, 2008). 
42 Alain-G. Gagnon, La Raison du plus fort. See also Gagnon and Iacovino Federalism, 
Citizenship, and Quebec, op.cit. 
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The concept of multinational federalism has gained much salience among Canadian 
academies since the collapse of the Meech Lake Accord. As to the institutional dimension of 
multinational federalism, Philip Resnjck proposed the archetypes of "multinational federation" 
and "territorial federation", the former being a federation whereby minorities are constituted 
as "nations" in a country. The latter concept, "territorial federation," is based on the principle 
of one nation-state where formally equal powers are given to the provinces.43 Moreover, 
Kymlicka suggested the establishment of an asymmetrical model of federalism as the way to 
realize multinational federalism in the political community. He maintains that generally, 
nationally-based units seek greater powers, while region-based units are Jess likely to do so. 
Therefore, he defines asymmetrical federalism as federalism that gives more powers to a 
specifie province, so that a "nation" living therein has the rights to autonomy for preserving 
its own culture and language. Kymlicka states as follows: 
In a federal system that contains both region-based and nationality-based units, it 
seems likely that demands will arise for sorne form of asymmetrical f ederalism: a 
system in which sorne federal units have greater self-goveming powers than others.44 
Kymlicka distinguishes "nation" from " immigrant groups" because the term "nation" 
means a historical community, more or Jess institutionally complete, occupying a given 
43 Philip Resnick, "Toward a Multinational Federalism: Asymmetrical and Confederal 
Alternatives", in F. Leslie Seidle (ed.), Seeking a New Canadian Partnership (Montreal : 
IRPP, 1994), 71. 
44 Will Kymlicka, Finding our way: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), 141. 
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territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and culture.45 On the contrary, " immigrant 
groups" are defined as groups which do not occupy their homeland, and their distinctiveness 
is manifested primarily in their family lives and in voluntary associations and they wish to be 
assimilated into culture of the host society in the future .46 Nations, however, possess their 
own culture (what Kymlicka terms the societal culture), that is, a culture which provides its 
members with "meaningful ways of !ife" across the full range of human activities, including 
social, educational religious, recreational, and economie !ife, encompassing both public and 
private spheres. These cultures tend to be territorially concentrated, and based on a shared 
language. Therefore, nations such as French Canadian and aboriginal peoples can have rights 
to their autonomy. That means that these nations can demand special powers in Canadian 
federation, a form of federal organization he terms "asymmetrical federation". 
Regarding multinational federalism, Resnick developed its institutional aspect. He 
reflected on the institutional possibility of asymmetrical federalism that provides one 
province with special powers. In order to balance the province given special powers with 
other provinces, he thought it a useful option to decrease the powers that the ' selected' 
province wields in federal politics, namely, the representatives it has in the federal legislature. 
This option stipulates a trade-off, whereby representatives from the province with special 
45 Ibid., 11 . 
46 Ibid., 14. 
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powers would not participate in discussions in the federal legislature if the subject matter 
does not concern the jurisdictional reach of the ' selected ' province in question.47 
On the other band, Kymlicka examined asymmetrical federalism in terrns of 
sociological reasoning, including definitions of nation and immigrant groups. However, these 
sociological terms alone are insufficient for examining the merits of asymmetrical federalism 
because, a constitutional arrangement and the legal system that emerges from it is 
underpinned by elements that run deeper in the human psyche, such as the ethos of a citizenry, 
commonly held views of political and legal legitimacy, and justice. Thus, multinational 
federalism should be examined not only in its institutional aspect but also in its normative 
aspect. 
In the process of ratifying the Meech Lake Accord, multinational federalism was 
criticized by English-speaking Canadians on the grounds that the recognition of the distinct 
society clause brings about the inequality between the provinces, giving the Québec a special 
status. The reason behind this is that they have judged the Québécois society to be an illiberal 
47 Philip Resnick, "Toward a Multinational Federalism: Asymmetrical and Confederal 
Alternatives", op. cit., 80-8 1. 
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society. It is Charles Taylor that tried to solve the problem from the viewpoint of differences 
in rights conceptions and propose the significance of multinational federalism . 
Taylor' s solution for post-1982 Canada reunification is as follows: White citizens in 
the rest of Canada are united around the principle of procedural (jberalism (a view that 
individual rights must always come first and must take precedence over collective rights) 
embedded in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Québec society has a rather different 
model of a liberal society, that is, society which can be organized around a defmition of the 
good life (collective goals), without this being seen as a depreciation of those who do not 
personally share this definition.48 Therefore, there are two incompatible views of liberal 
society in post-Meech Lake Canada. According to him, the way of reunification is that 
procedural liberais in English Canada just have to acknowledge, first, that there are other 
possible models of liberal society and, second, that their francophone compatriots wish to live 
by one such altemative.49 That is, English speaking provinces should recognize this type of 
society through the asymmetrical federalism. The term he uses for this is 'deep diversity' , 
where the way of being a Canadian for French-speaking people in Québec is by their 
belonging to a constituent element of Canada, " la nation québécoise."50 
48 Taylor "Shared and Divergent Values" op.cit., 173-177. 
49 Ibid., 178. 
50 Ibid., 182. 
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Certainly, Taylor seeks to take into consideration the trend that Québécois want to 
preserve their own language through their own language law (for example, the Charter oftbe 
French language, commonly called Bill 101), and demand their autonomy and sometimes 
even independence as the collective goal. However, this mode! portrays an oversimplified 
duality where Québec is depicted completely as "collective", and the rest of Canada is 
epitomized as embodying "procedural and individualistic liberalism." Therefore, 
multinational federalism for English Canadians still seems to be a system designated to 
benefit the collective tendencies of Québécois society. Altematively, multinational federalism 
is a form offederalism where each nation is both an individual and collective society, entitled 
as such to the process of nation-building. 
Cao we correctly perceive the constitutional conflict between Canada and Québec 
from Charles Taylor' s dichotomous viewpoint that Québécois society has more "collectivist" 
tendencies, and where the rest of Canada is framed as a more "liberal individualistic" 
society? Therefore, we would like to construct the following hypothesis: In the 
Canada-Québec constitutional conflict, the discussion that the conflict is framed as being 
between individual and collective rights is overly simplistic, because Québec' s view of rights, 
in particular, René Lévesque's conception of rights, includes the individual and the collective 
simultaneously. 
In reconsidering the Taylor's dichotomy, the examination of opinions about rights in 
Québec, 'Quebec' s view of rights' has great significance. Here, we would like to define the 
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concept of 'the Québec's view of rights' as opinions of Québec politicians and intellectuals 
about rights. Through the examination of these opinions, the argument on rights in Québec 
includes both aspects of the collective and the individual. In this master thesis, we would like 
to stress the genuine conception of rights of the former premier of Québec, René Lévesque, 
namely the necessary complementarity between individual rights and collective rights. 51 
In order to examine the Québec's conception of rights, in particular, Lévesque' s 
conception, we employ a qualitative and historical methodology in order to examine 
theoretical statements and opinions by statesman and intellectuals concerned in the conflict 
over the Constitution Act, 1982 and the Canadian Charter. In particular, to stress the 
originality of statement of René Lévesque in the federal-constitutional conferences of 1980 
and 1981, in this study we place an emphasis on debates that occurred during these 
constitutional conferences. However, to clarif)t the similarity and differences between 
Lévesque and other Québec statesmen and intellectuals, we need to examine the thoughts of 
these statesmen and intellectuals, and the debate in the national assembly. Firstly, we would 
like to examine the work of Gary Caldwell "Le Québec ne doit pas se donner une 
constitution"52 and the work of Léon Dion "Séance pléniere: synthèse et prospective"53 
51 René Lévesque, René Lévesque: Textes et Entrevues 1960-1987 Textes colligés par Michel 
Lévesque en collaboration avec Rachel Casaubon (Montréal: Presses de l'Université du 
Québec, 1991), 240. 
52 Gary Caldwell, «Le Québec ne doit pas se donner une constitution», Philosophiques vol. 
XIX, 2 (1992). 
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because these articles afford us better understanding of the reason why Québec intellectuals 
insist on the significance of parliamentary democracy. Secondly, we would like to examine 
the debate in national assembly54 between Jérôme Choquette and Jacques-Yvan Morin 
because the debate reveals that there are differences in opinions about parliamentary 
democracy in Québec. In examining the debate, we would like to refer to the work of Morin, 
"Une charte des droits de l'homme pour le Québec"55 in order to consider the argument of 
Morin in more detail. Thirdly, we would like to examine the work of Claude Ryan Regards 
sur le f édéralisme canadien56 and the work of Fernand Dumont Raisons communes 57 
because these works clarify that there is difference in conception of rights between Québec 
intellectuals. 
As to the Chapter 2, we would like to use mainly primary documents in order to 
examine the political conflict over the conception of rights. Québec govemments have been 
opposed to the entrenchment of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms into Constitution since 
1967, and they have demanded the establishment of the special constitutional court on the 
53 Léon Dion, « Séance pléniere : synthèse et prospective » dans la Conférence sur le 
parlementarisme britannique, Le parlementarisme britannique anachronisme ou réalité 
moderne?: documents et débats (Québec: Assemblée nationale, 1980). 
54 Gouvernement du Québec, Ministère des Relations internationales, La démocratie 
québécoise par les textes. (Études & Documents) Textes choisis et présentés par Marc 
Chevrier (Québec city, 1998), 95-103. 
55 Jacques-Yvan Morin, « Une charte des droits de l' homme pour le Québec», McGill Law 
Journal vol. 9 (1963). 
56 Claude Ryan, Regards sur le fédéralisme canadien (Montréal: Boréal, 1995). 
57 Fernand Dumont, Raisons communes 2e éd.(Montréal: Éditions du Boréal, 1997). 
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European model for the purpose of protection of provincial autonomy. 58 About these subjects, 
the public document entitled Québec 's Positions on Constitutional and Inter governmental 
issues from 1936 to March 2001 59 published by the secrétariat aux Affaires 
intergouvernementales canadiennes is well worth referring to. Sorne intellectuals in Québec, 
also, bave been opposed to entrenchment of the Charter and demanded the constitutional 
court. One of them is Jacques-Yvan Morin. He insisted on establishment of the special 
constitutional court on Austrian model60. 
As to the Chapter 3 and 4, sorne documents published by federal govemment are 
worth referring to. For example, we can grasp the main point of federal constitutional 
conferences held before 1980 from the document entitled 'resume of federal-provincial 
constitutional conferences: 1927-1980. ' we think that the debate over entrencbment of the 
Charter came to a climax between two constitutional conferences; federal-provincial 
constitutional conferences of 1980 and 1981 because there was a tuming point in the debate 
58 André Tremblay, La Réforme de la constitution au Canada (Montréal: Les Éditions 
Themis, 1995), 114-119. 
59 Gouvemment du Québec, Secrétariat aux affaires intergouvermentales canadiennes, 
Quebec 's Positions on Constitutional and Inter governmental issues from 1936 to March 
2001 , http://www.saic.gouv.qc.ca/institutionnelles constitutionnelles/table matieres en.btm. 
The French version is entitled, Positions du Québec dans les domaines constitutionnel et 
intergouvernemental de 1936 à mars 2001 (Québec city, 2001). 
60 Marc Chevrier, « Contrôle judiciaire et gouverne démocratique : de la « législation 
judiciaire» au Canada depuis 1982 » Thèse pour le doctorat de l'Institut d'etudes politiques 
de Paris (2000), 46-47. 
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over the Charter of Rights. After the constitutional conferences ended in disagreement of 
opinions between participants, eight provinces (excluding Ontario and New Brunswick) held 
meetings and came to agreement about their own plan for a constitution in April 1981. The 
resolution and discussion of these conferences held by eight premiers also are worth referring 
to. During the constitutional conference of 1981, the alliance of eight provinces broke up and 
seven English speaking provinces came to agreement about the plan proposed by the federal 
government. Tbere was difference in the conception of rights between Québec and the rest of 
Canada in this constitutional conference. Therefore we would like to put my examination 
especially on originality of Lévesque's conception of rights and the difference between 
Lévesque's and the Trudeau and English Canadian premiers ' conception ofrights. 
CHAPTER I 
QUÉBEC'S CONCEPTIONS OF RIGHTS 
1.1 The position of Québec govemment about the rights: from Jean Lesage to René Lévesque 
government. 
In examining Lévesque's conception of rights, it is helpful to understand what 
kind of conception of rights the Québec governments since the latter half of 1960's have had. 
The proposai on Constitutional reform and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms put forward 
by Trudeau, (who just took the post of prime minister of Canada) was a tuming point in the 
Québec government's thinking on rights. Though Canada was formed as a kind of federation 
in 1867 by the British North America Act and a dominion of the British Empire, in fact 
Canada has never been a confederation but a quasi-federation, an 'unitary federal state' . The 
reason of it is that the British North America Act had the highly centralized character.61 
Although unti l the end of the Second World War, Canada has acquired most of the powers 
necessary for self-govemance, but the power to revise its own constitution independently has 
remained in the hands of the British parliament. Therefore, Canada needed to repatriate the 
61 Carl J. Friedrich, Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice (London: Pail Mail Press, 
1968), 119. 
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powers to revise its constitution by reforming the British North America Act. Since the 
federal-provincial constitutional conference held by Mackenzie King (Premier Minister of 
Canada in 1927), there have been a number of conferences held concerning the way to 
address the problem of amending formula. In particular, Trudeau's appearance on the federal 
political scene animated the process of constitutional revision because it added the new issue 
of the entrenchment of the Charter of Human Rights to the constitutional revision agenda. 
In the federal-provincial constitutional conference of January 1968, Trudeau 
announced four purposes for the Canadian federation. The first one was to maintain the 
character of federalism in Canada. The second one was to respect the rights of individual 
Canadians (including language rights, namely rights for English or French Canadians to use 
either English or French in public institutions). The third one was to make the individual 
development of Canadian citizens a main purpose of Canadian federation, which concerns 
every aspect of individual development, encompassing the economie, social and cultural 
spheres. Canada was charged with the responsibility to provide every Canadian with the 
opportunity to enhance every aspect of his or her own development. The fourth one was to 
ensure that Canada is ranked in the international community as an active contributor to 
international peace. Trudeau sought to insert these four purposes in a new Canadian 
constitution. The aim of his action in doing so was, by way of describing the purpose of 
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Canada in the Constitution, to clearly define the rights, interests and purposes of the Canadian 
nation and promote a sense of unity in Canada. 62 
How then, have Québec govemments responded to the proposais originally tabled 
by Trudeau? Québec govemments have repeated demands for its autonomy since the Quiet 
revolution of 1960, when the Jean Lesage government began to insist on the special status of 
Québec in Canada. According to him, Québec, as the comerstone of French Canada, is asking 
for the equality of Canada's two founding ethnie groups (groupes ethniques). It is seeking a 
status that respects its special characteristics.63 
This means the positive affirmation of autonomy in economical, social, and cultural 
spheres. In the Fulton-Favreau Formula of 1964, Lesage agreed to the Formula because he 
thought it limited the powers of federal government. However, public opinion was 
vehemently opposed to this proposai on the ground that the formula makes it impossible for 
62 Pierre Elliott Trudeau, The constitution and the people of Canada: An approach to the 
Objectives of Confederation, the Rights of People and the Institutions of Government 
(Ottawa: Govemment of Canada, 1969), 2-16. 
63 Gouvernement du Québec, Secrétariat aux affaires intergouvermentales canadiennes, 
Positions du Québec dans les domaines constitutionnel et intergouvernemental de 1936 à 
mars 2001 (Québec city, 2001), 26. 
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Québec to have a veto and additional powers. Finally, Lesage withdrew his consent to the 
Formula.64 
In his work titled Égalité ou indépendance, Daniel Johnson of the Union Nationale 
clarified the Québec provincial government position in insisting that Canada cannot merely 
be perceived as a federation consisting often provinces, but should also explicitly state that it 
is a union of two nations; one English and the other French, which are equal in rights un der 
this union.65 He came to power in the Québec general election of 1966, when his party 
defeated the Parti libéral under Lesage. In the federal-constitutional conference of 1968 
proposed by federal govemment where entrenchment of the Charter of Rights firstly appeared 
on the agenda of amendment formula, Johnson suggested that Québec should have its own 
charter of rights to be administered by the Québec government, in addition to the Canadian 
Charter of Rights under the jurisdiction of the federal government. That is, he suggested that 
Canada sbould have Charters of Rights at botb federal and provincial leve!. He stressed that 
the entrenchment of the Canadian Charter was just one of the questions which must be 
studied under the ambit of a total review of the Constitution during the constitutional 
conference of 1968.66 Among his proposais, which reflected a decentralization-oriented 
64 Russel, Constitutional Odyssey, op.cit., 73-74. 
65 Daniel Johnson, Égalité ou indépendance (Montréal : Éd. renaisssance, 1965). 
66 Fogarty, Stephen, Resume of federal-provincial constitutional conferences: 1927-1980 
(Ottawa: Research Branch of the Library ofParliament, 1980), 19. 
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thinking, was a significant one, such as the establishment of a special constitutional court. He 
stated as follows : 
Dans un pays unitaire dont la société est homogène, il est possible de concevoir les 
déclarations de droits comme résumant la philosophie morale acceptée par toute la 
population, et d'en faire découler tous les droits des citoyens. Ceci a alors pour 
résultat de consacrer dans la Constitution une tendance à l' homogénéité des 
conceptions éthiques dont l' application relève des tribunaux.67 
Following his thinking, in a federal system, particularly Canada, enacting the 
constitution in this way makes a senous political mistake. The tradition of civil law in 
Québec and the way that it recognizes and protects fundamental rights are markedly different 
from the court procedures in a system of common law. Therefore, he makes the insistence 
that a special constitutional court should be established.68 Without the special constitutional 
court, the unilateral definition of rights by the supreme court of Canada uniformly is applied 
to the Québec. According to Johnson 's proposai for the special constitutional court, at least 
2/3 judges ofthe court should be appointed by the provinces and the composition of this court 
should reflect the federal character of common institutions and the Canadian cultural duality, 
unl ike the existing Supreme Court whose judges are appointed by federal government. 69 
67 Gouvernement du Québec, Secrétariat aux affaires intergouvernementales canadiennes, 
Positions du Québec dans les domaines constitutionnel et intergouvernemental de 1936 à 
mars 2001 (Québec city, 2001), 35 
68 Ibid. 
69 lbid. ,34. 
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It was under the Robert Bourassa government of 1970 that Québec first 
established its own Charter of Rights. In his time in politics, Bourassa has sought cultural 
autonomy, widely known as the 'distinct society' argument. On the other hand, Bourassa has 
also been supportive of the Charter of Rights proposed by the federal government to the 
extent that it did not prevent the establishment of the Québec Charter of Rights. In addition, 
he has demanded the establishment of a constitutional court for Canada as Johnson did.70 
From the preceding arguments, it was found that Québec governments have 
maintained a tradition of arguing in support of the significance of provincial parliament as 
weil as of pressing demands for the establishment of a Canadian constitutional court. Since 
these requests embody Québec's desire to determine its own rights by its own hands, in this 
respect it can be characterized as collectivist. However, Québec sought to establish its own 
Charter of Rights that aims at the protection of individual rights, which then as a consequence 
exposes the main problem with the argument of Pierre Trudeau who main tains that Québec is 
an illiberal society. 
In the construction of the Québec Charter of Rights, regarding the type of 
autonomy pursued by different Québec governments, there are differences in the type of 
autonomy advocated between the Québec liberal Party and Parti Québécois. In order to 
70 Ibid., 48. 
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elucidate this difference, it is helpful to study arguments over the establishment of the 
Québec Charter ofRights in the next section. 
1.2 The 1974 debate around the Québec's Charter in National Assembly. 
As we examined in the preceding section, since Trudeau proposed the original plan 
for the entrenchment of the Charter of Rights, Québec governments have demanded the right 
to a separate charter of rights. The Québec Charter of Rights was enacted in 1975 under the 
Québec liberal party, Robert Bourassa' s government. The purpose of this Charter is clearly to 
give legal protection to individual rights and freedom. Moreover, the Charter of Rights was 
more in advance of the times than other Canadian provincial Charter of Rights because the 
Charter included also social and economie rights.71 While it is generally said that collective 
rights are placed over individual rights in Québec, the existence of this charter is important 
counter evidence to the contrary. 
71 André Morel, « La Charte québécoise des droits et libertés : un document unique dans 
l'histoire législative canadienne» dans Revue juridique Thémis, vol. 21, (1 987), 16-17. 
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However, on the question of the opportunity of enacting a Québec Charter of 
Rights, there was disagreement between the Liberal Party of Québec and the Parti Québécois: 
the disagreement between Jérôme Choquette, the Québec minister of justice and member of 
Québec liberal party, and Jacques-Y van Morin, member of Parti Québécois in the National 
assembly. After graduating from McGill University and practicing law in Montreal, 
Choquette has been a representative of the Québec liberal party since 1966 and has served as 
Minister of justice under the Bourassa government from 1970 to 1975. Morin, on the other 
hand, entered the sovereignty movement of Québec and has acted as representative of the 
Parti Québécois in 1973 after similarly, graduating from McGill University and having taught 
law at the University of Montreal. ln the 1973 general election of Québec when the Parti 
Québécois failed to take power, René Lévesque (the leader of the party) even lost in his own 
riding. Therefore, Lévesque appointed Morin the leader of the National Assembly of Québec. 
At that time, since the Parti Québécois held the position of the official opposition party, 
following the demise of the Union Nationale, Morin assumed the leadership of the official 
opposition in the National Assembly. 
Firstly, we would like to examine the argument put forth by Choquette. In the 
debate in the National Assembly in 1974, Choquette stated that the frrst aim of the Québec 
Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms is to make Québec follow the same current of 
legislative development among Western countries, with respect to individual rights and 
freedoms, every western countries bas a dedicated law which aims to defend individual rights 
and freedoms, which was a normative standard for being a "Western country". The second 
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aim of the Charter is to integrate the princip le that has been cultivated over generations in 
Québec, namely, democratie values and respect for the individual, while ensuring a degree of 
legal flexibility in order to accommodate values that Québec's society may come to accept in 
the future. The third aim is to enable the values which individual rights and freedoms include 
to develop in the future . The fourth and final aim is to provide the relief measures in case 
individual rights and freedoms are violated, by establishing a commission of the Charter of 
Human Rights and Freedoms.72 In sum, the aim of the Québec Charter ofHuman Rights and 
Freedoms proposed by Choquette was to defend individual rights and freedoms. 
Morin of the Parti Québécois didn't have any objection to the idea of Québec having 
its own Charter for the purpose of protecting individual rights and freedoms. 73 In fact, Morin 
had proposed his own version of a plan to establish a Québec Charter of Rights as early as 
1963. In an article of his in the McGill Law Journal, he argued that Québec also should 
participate in the trend of protecting Human Rights and fundamental freedoms. 74 Moreover, 
according to him, while in Québec collective communitarian ties used to be respected, they 
were rapidly becoming Jess significant. The graduai disappearance of communitarian ti es is a 
common trend among industrial societies based on the organ izing principle of individual 
self-interest, and is described as a civilisational feature of North America. Under these 
72 Assemblée nationale du Québec, Journal des Débats, deuxième session-30e Législature, 
vol.l5, No. 79, (1974), 2741 -2743. 
73 Ibid., 2750. 
74 Jacques-Y van Morin, « Une charte des droits de l'homme pour le Québec » McGill Law 
Journal vol. 9 (1963), 273. 
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circumstances, it is necessary to invent new modalities of pursuing communitarian life, and 
thus actively seek to redefme the social aim of the group within which individuals occupy. 
For this purpose, the Québec Charter ofRights and Freedoms is seen to be ideal measures for 
fostering a sense of social composition.75 
Although Morin also agreed with Choquette on the necessity of enacting the 
Québec Charter of Rights, he pointed out that as to the legal status it was not enough. 
Choquette insisted that the Québec Charter should be an ordinary law and not superior to 
other laws because Québec has a strong tradition of parliamentary democracy. He advocated 
England's approach to individual rights, whereby individual rights and freedoms are 
determined by a variety of legal documents of varying statutes, which are amended by 
succeeding parliaments and representatives of people in the parliamentary tradition, rather 
than establishing a constitutional order with absolute principle. 
In contrast to this, Morin intended to put the Québec Charter in a position similar to 
a constitution because, according to him, the Québec Charter of Rights was not sim ply an act 
of ordinary law, but one which defines both the demands from individuals and groups and the 
social, economie, political, cultural rights, and fundamental rights of Quebecers. Thus it 
would be a standard reference for ali other laws to be passed. According to him, the second 
75 Assemblée nationale du Québec, Journal des Débats, deuxième session-30e Législature, 
vol.l5, No. 79, 1974, op.cit, 2750. 
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paragraph of section 45 of the Charter prescribes that the Charter should not be interpreted as 
revising or restricting every ordinary law. But, this Charter is neither a Charter nor a 
fundamental law. This is an ordinary law, which can be denied by other ordinary laws. 
Subsequently, this law should not be generally called a Charter in constitutions and 
legislation of other countries."76 
This reveals that Morin wanted to give the Charter the position similar to a 
constitution. However, Morin also did not 1gnore the long tradition of parliamentary 
democracy in Québec. He stated that within parliamentary democracy (that is the sovereignty 
of parliament), this kind of Charter cao be enacted. According to him, Albert Dicey's 
constitutional theory of parliamentarism77 (on which Choquette ' s proposai was based) is 
insufficient. It is true that parliament cannot deny the discretion of its own and its succeeding 
law makers. While it is true that with regards to the legitimate legislative rights forming the 
foundation of parliament, it is not possible to deny legislative discretionary powers to 
successive generations of legislators. However, Morin referred to the theory of Sir Ivor 
76 The original text is as follow : «La charte ne doit pas être interprétée de manière à 
modifier ou restreindre la portée de toute autre loi .... C'est abuser du mot «charte» que d'y 
inclure un article comme 45e. Ce mot signifie: loi fondamentale ... Le projet qui nous est 
proposé ce soir n'est ni une charte, ni une loi fondamentale. C'est une loi ordinaire qui peut 
être contredite demain par une autre loi. » Ibid., 2755. 
77 His main works are as follows; Albert Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of 
the Constitution ](f edition (London: Macmillan, 1962). 
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Jennings78 (English scholar of constitutional theory in the 1930's). ln his the law and the 
constitution, Jennings argued as follows, 
"Legal sovereignty" is merely a name indicating that the legislature has for the time 
being power to make laws of any kind in the manner required by the law. That is, a 
rule expressed to be made by the Queen, "with the advice and consent of the Lords 
spiritual and temporal, and Commons in this present Parliament assembled, and by 
the authority of the same," will be recognized by the courts, including a rule which 
alters this law itself. If this is so, the "legal sovereign" may impose legal limitations 
upon itself, because its power to change law includes the power to change the law 
affecting itself.79 
Based on this theory, Morin stated that in establishing a rigid constitutional formula, 
it is justifiable, in a sense, to restrict the discretionary powers of parliament with regards to 
the Charter80. 
From the preceding arguments it can be concluded that, although there were 
differences between the Québec Liberais and the Parti Québécois towards the Québec Charter 
of Rights, we can find agreement between them on the points of the overall necessity of the 
Charter ofRights, as weil as the respect for the parliamentary democracy. 
78 His main works are as follows, Sir lvor Jennings, The British constitution (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1967) and The law and the constitution fifth edition (London: 
Un iversity of London Press, 1959). 
79 Sir Ivor Jennings, The law and the constitution fifth edition (London: University of 
London Press, 1959), 152-153 
80 Assemblée nationale du Québec, Journal des Débats, deuxième session-30° Législature, 
vol.l5, No. 79, (1974), op.cit., 2756. 
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Québec government' s faith in parliamentary democracy is the main reason for its 
opposition to the Canadian Charter, which from their view causes the politicization of the 
judiciary as the Supreme Court of Canada interprets the Canadian Charter. ln fact, according 
to Léon Dion, parliament is the source of true sovereignty in democratie societies, and there 
can be no dernocracy in a society that has no parliament.81 Gary Caldwell argued that the 
sovereignty ofparliament is absolute and no one can violate it. He cited the words of Edmund 
Burke, saying that " .. . the House ofCommons cannot abandon its authority. The engagement 
and contract of society are going on un der the name of the constitution."82 
However, as the discussion surrounding the Québec Charter of Rights has shown, it 
is evident that the overlap between judiciary and legislature was not the only subject of 
contention. As Morin stated that his support for necessities of the Québec Charter of Rights 
does not contradict the principle of parliamentary sovereignty (as was explained in the 
preceding argument), actually the problem is rather that, within Canada' s judicial system ali 
superior court judges are appointed by the federal government. Therefore, Québec 
governments have been making repeated demands for the reform of the Supreme Court 
nomination's process. The important question here is whether or not Quebecers can represent 
81 Léon Dion, « Séance pléniere : synthèse et prospective », dans la Conférence sur le 
parlementarisme britannique, Le parlementarisme britannique anachronisme ou réalité 
moderne ?: documents et débats (Québec : Assemblée nationale, 1980), 227-229. 
82 Gary Caldwell, «Le Québec ne doit pas se donner une constitution : Tl en a déjà une qu' il 
abandonnerait à ses risques et péri ls,» Philosophiques, vol XIX, 2 (1992), 196. 
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their will in parliament and courts, which have been charged with determining the concrete 
contents of abstract rights. Janet Ajzenstat, an English Canadian academie who supports the 
significance of notwithstanding clause of the 1982 Constitution from the viewpoint of 
parliamentary democracy, pointed out that parliamentary sovereignty according to Albert 
Dicey is not only based on the principle of parliamentary sovereignty but also on the rule of 
law (govemments and officiais should be subject to the law), thus parliament and the rule of 
law sbould be mutually reinforcing.83 In fact, Dicey stated tbat the principle tbat parliament 
speaks only througb an Act of Parliament great! y increases the authority of the judges on the 
following two grounds. The first one is that English j udges have refused to interpret an Act of 
Parliament otherwise th an by reference to the words of the enactment. The second one is that 
English Parliament as such has never exercised direct executive power or appointed the 
officiais of the executive government.84 In the light of this theory about coexistence of the 
parliament and the rule of law, Québec' s claim for parliamentary democracy and Canadian 
constitutional court may be said to parallel that of Dicey. 
83 Janet Ajzenstat, "Reconciling Parliament and Rigbts: A.V. Dicey Reads the Canadian 
Charter of Rigbts and Freedoms," Canadian Journal of Political Science, XXX4 (1997): 
645. 
84 Dicey, Introduction to the study of the law of the constitution Tenth Edition, op.cit., 
407-408. 
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After discussion in the National Assembly of Québec, a provision concerning 
supremacy of the Charter over other laws85 was inserted into the Québec Charter of Rights 
and adopted in 1975 by the National Assembly of Québec. However, the Québec Charter put 
more emphasis on parliament than the Canadian Charter. 
According to José Woehrling, the normative concept for rights for Québec and 
Canada are different. This is found to be so with respect to the Québec Charter of Human 
Rights and Freedoms. According to this text, the Québec Charter transfers Jess authority to 
the courts than the Canadian Charter does. According to his comparative study, the limiting 
provision of Section 9.1 of the Québec Charter prescribes that "in exercising his fundamental 
freedoms and rights, a person shall maintain a proper regard for democratie values, public 
order and the general well-being of the citizens of Québec. In this respect, the scope of the 
freedoms and rights, and limits to their exercise, may be fixed by law. On the contrary, the 
limiting provision in Section 1 of the Canadian Charter corresponds more closely to a 
conception of rights as pre-existing the legislator's intervention, which inevitably restrains 
and limits them rather than providing a framework for the ir exercise.86 
85 The section 52 of the Quebec Charter ofRights and Freedoms stipulates as follows: 
No provision of any Act, even subsequent to the Charter, may derogate from sections! to 38, 
except so far as provided by those sections, unless such Act expressly states that it applies 
despite the Charter. 
86 José Woehrling «Les conséquences de l'application de la charte canadienne des droits et 
libertés pour la vie politique et démocratique et l'équilibre du système fédéral » dans 
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Fernand Dumont, the distinguished Québécois sociologist, criticized the Canadian 
Charter, saying that it is only effective in establishing and maintaining individual rights and 
that it erodes the collective character of Québec. The philosophy underlying the Charter will 
lead to a state that 'assembles' individuals concerned solely with their own rights. The 
Canadian Charter, like Canadian multicultural policy, fragments social structure, accentuates 
the principle of individualism, and fosters a variety of interest groups (which refer directly to 
a state in order to defend their rights, and which results in veiling the particularity of 
Québécois nation within the Canada). Based on the reasons stated above, Dumont criticized 
the Canadian Charter for causing the superiority of the individual rights as its sole base.87 
On the contrary, although Claude Ryan (who was then chief editor of Le Devoir and 
would later become the leader of the Québec liberal party) advocated the autonomy of French 
Canada, his political philosophy was liberal individualism. Therefore, he regarded the 
Québec Charter of Rights and Freedoms as important on the ground that it gave priority to 
individual rights.88 For the same reason, he advocated for the Canadian Charter of Rights. 
Therefore, he went against Dumont's argument that the Canadian Charter fragments social 
structure, accentuates the principle of individualism, and violates collective rights. Ryan 
Gagnon, Alain-G., (dir.), Le fédéralisme canadien contemporain: Fondements, traditions, 
institutions (Montréal: Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 2006), 277. 
87 Fernand Dumont, Raisons communes 2e éd (Montréal : Éditions du Boréal, 1997), 44-45. 
88 Olivier Mareil, La raison et l 'équilibre: Libéralisme, nationalisme et catholicisme dans la 
pensée de Claude Ryan au Devoir (1 962-1978) (Montréal: Éditions Varia, 2002), 212-213. 
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argued that there is nothing wrong with the fact that the Charter of Rights accentuates 
individualism, because it is the very essential purpose of the Charter of Rights. Although 
judges are appointed by federal govemment, Canadian courts generally judge ail parties 
concerned in cases brought before them fairly, and fulfills its obligations about protection of 
individual rights with dignity, impartiality and humanity.89 
These arguments of Ryan and Dumont came short of the complementarity between 
individual and collective rights because Ryan put emphasis on individual rights and Dumont 
stressed collective rights. 
In sum, from Morin ' s arguments for the supremacy ofthe Québec Charter we can find 
that he sought to balance between the parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law. 
However, as José Legault points out, it is true that an entrenched Charter can reduce political 
conflicts in rights problems, with the danger of underrnining political discussion which plays 
important role in solution of conflicts between within individuals and within groups.90 Th us, 
democratie discussion is important in deciding the concrete contents of rights, and in that 
point we can find the possibility of the complementarity between individual and collective 
rights, which René Lévesque would seek later. 
89 Claude Ryan, Regards sur le fédéralisme canadien (Montréal: Boréal, 1995), 174-178. 
90 Josée Legau lt, «Les Dangers d'une charte des droits enchâssée pour un Québec 
indépendant», dans Michel Seymour (dir.) Une nation peut-elle se donner la constitution de 
son choix?, (Montréal: Editions Bellarmin, 1995), 162-163. 
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In1976 René Lévesque took power in Québec and opposed to Trudeau's plans for a 
Canadian Charter. Under these circumstances, white the new leader of the Québec liberal 
party, Ryan, sided with Trudeau about constitutional problem, Lévesque developed his 
original conception of rights to achieve the complementarity between individual rights and 
collective rights in the debate over the Canadian Charter. Before examining his logic, it is 
helpful to begin with an examination of the constitutional conferences in 1970's. 
CHAPTER II 
A CONFLICT IN CONCEPTION OF RIGHTS BETWEEN CANADA AND 
QUÉBEC: THE DEBATE IN THE FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONFERENCES FROM THE 1970' S TO 1980' S. 
2.1 Federal-provincial conferences in the 1970' s 
As we mentioned in the previous chapter, before 1982 constitution, the discussion 
over the amending formula has been going on since the 1960' s. In particular, the 
Fulton-Favreau project was important in proposing the rule of unanimity regarding 
modification of provincial powers.91 However, as mentioned above, it resulted in failure. 
After that, the successive federal-provincial conferences were held in February 1968 and June 
1969, and the subject for discussion at these conferences was not language rights and the 
91 André Tremblay, La réforme de la constitution au Canada, (Montréal :Les Éditions 
Thémis, l995), 46-49. 
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Charter of Rights, but mainly economie matters such as federal taxation and federal spending 
power.92 
It was in the 1970' s that the subject of discussion again switched to the appropriate 
formula to be adopted for amending formula, which soon became an issue of hot contention. 
At the constitutional conference of 1970, Robert Bourassa, who was then newly elected 
premier of Québec, expressed more interest in the economie problem than constitutional one. 
Bourassa sought to shift the Québec liberal party ' s position to one more favorable towards 
Trudeau' s thought, namely support for Canadian federation . Bourassa made this change 
because he was primarily concemed with Québec' s economie issues, which he prioritized 
over the politicized arguments connected to the Repatriation debate. In this way, he expressed 
his intentions to make concessions to the federal government regarding sorne items in order 
to put an end to the constitutional conflict and reach a compromise as soon as possible. 
However, unable to ignore the rising tide of nationalism in Québec, Bourassa instead 
hammered a position advocating Québec' s cultural sovereignty. In order to realize this 
platform, it was necessary for his government to obtain greater jurisdictional authority in the 
fi elds of immigration and communication. Therefore, his fi rst concem became the greater 
division of powers as Daniel Johnson and Jean-Jacques Bertrand have claimed, wh ile on the 
92 Stephen Fogarty, Resume of f ederal-provincial constitutional coriferences: 1928-1980 
(Ottawa: Research Branch, 1980), 18-20. 
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other hand supporting the Canadian Charter ofRights proposed by Trudeau.93 Thus, Trudeau 
warmly welcomed Bourassa because he regarded Bourassa's government as a clear ally in his 
position on federalism. 
With these political conditions in place, at a working group held in Ottawa on 
February 1971, Trudeau made the announcement that federal and provincial governments 
should tackle the question of constitutional repatriation as weil as the amending formula as 
soon as possible. 
ln the middle of June 1971 , a federal-provincial conference was held in Victoria, 
British Colombia, where Trudeau proposed a constitutional formula called the "Victoria 
Charter", which prescribed the suspension of the power for governors general to disavow 
provincial laws as weil as gave constitutional veto rights for Ontario, Québec, and the 
Atlantic provinces, along with the right to opt out from the shared cost programs established 
by the federal government. Since this Charter allows Québec to have constitutional veto on 
most of constitutional amendments, Bourassa, the premier of Québec positively welcomed 
the Charter.94 In addition, this Charter includes provisions concerned with the entrenchment 
93 Resume of federal-provincial constitutional conferences: 1927-1980, (Ottawa; Research 
Branch, 1980), 27. 
94 Tremblay, La réforme de la constitution au Canada, op.cit., 51. 
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of basic political rights into constitution such as universal suffrage and free election. And it 
includes also provisions concerning language rights that French and English should be 
official languages in Canada. 
Although Bourassa initially agreed to the Victoria Charter, following the conference, 
the provincial premiers returned to consult with their constituencies on the question of 
whether to accept or reject the federal proposai, with a deadline for reply set the 281h of June. 
As a result though, the population of Québec was largely opposed to the Victoria Charter. 
Ryan, theo editor of Le Devoir, was one example of a prominent figure who campaigned 
against the Charter, and according to him, although this plan would provide Québec with a 
veto, it is insufficient because it constrains Québec to single passive position of rejecting 
unfavorable proposition or opposing so as to prevent other provinces from taking action . A 
passive veto in the place of positive initiative was not acceptable from this viewpoint. 
Moreover, most members of the Québec liberal Party were opposed to the Victoria Charter, 
in addition to the Parti Québécois, who criticized the veto by further pointing out that 
although the veto given by the Victoria Charter guarantees the right to opt out, it Jacks 
financial compensation . In the end, confronted with increased opposition, Bourassa withdrew 
his support for the Victoria Charter95 • 
95 Georges-Hébert Germain, Robert Bourassa (Montréal: Les Éditions Libre Expression, 
2012), 172-176. 
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The failure ofthe Victoria Charter was a great shock to the federal government, and 
greatly slowed down the pace of constitutional repatriation negotiation. The decisive tuming 
point was the Parti Québécois ' accession to power in 1976, and the first referendum on 
sovereignty association held in 1980. 
The next constitutional conference was held in November 1978, right after the 
general election of 1976, René Lévesque stated that it was doubtful whether large-scale 
decentralization for provinces was possible within the federal system that existed at the time, 
and clearly expressed opposition to the entrenchment of the Canadian Charter of Rights on 
the ground that it caused the judicialization of politics.96 In 1980, René Lévesque held a 
referendum, where he introduced his own conception of State, namely, "sovereignty 
association," which outlines a plan whereby Québec has political sovereignty, yet maintains 
an economie union with the rest of Canada. During this campaign against 
sovereignty-association, Trudeau promised to change the constitution so that the Québec 
would be content with it. The referendum ended in a victory for the No camp, with 40 % 
voting "Yes," against 60 % voting ' 'No". Trudeau declared that he was going to set about 
organ izing a new constitutional round, and decided to open the federal-provincial 
constitutional conference in September 1980. 
96 Fogarty, Resume of federal-provincial constitutional conferences, op. cit, 36. 
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2.2 The federal-provincial conference of 1980 
From the 8th to the 12th of September, 1980, a federal-provincial conference took 
place in Ottawa, where Prime Miojster Pierre E. Trudeau and ten provincial premiers 
gathered.97 This conference was of such significance, that Trudeau, acting as chairman, 
declared it to be the most important conference since the Charlottetown Accord of 1864, in 
which the founding fathers argued about the foundation of Canada. According to Fernand 
Dumont, the repatriation project executed by Trudeau is described as a "the second 
foundation of Canada."98 
In a public statement, Trudeau expressed hjs opinion about why the Charter of 
Rights and freedoms was necessary. According to him, the Charter is a matter related to the 
basic fun dam entai rights of the people. Therefore, he maintained that this matter should not 
97 Provincial premiers who attended this conference were as follows; 
William Davis, premier of Ontario, René Lévesque premier of Quebec, Richard Hatfield, 
premier of New Brunswick, John Buchanan, premier of Nova Scotia, Angus MacLean, 
premier of Prince Edward Island, Brian Peckford, premier of Newfoundland, Sterling Lyon, 
premier of Manitoba, Allan Blakeney, premier of Saskatchewan, Peter Lougheed, premier of 
Alberta, and Allan Williams, attorney General ofBritish Columbia. 
98 Fernand Dumont, Raisons communes 2e éd. (Montréal: Éditions du Boréal, 1997), 46. 
54 
be an object of bargaining between provincial and federal governments, but held that the 
Charter should belong to people directly. It is a question ofwhat basic fundamental rights are 
so sacred that neither the federal nor the provincial government should have the jurisdictional 
leeway to infringe upon those rights. However, as the formula for repatriation required 
unanimity between the premiers, it proved very difficult to reach a consensus. For example, 
in Victoria Charter, ali premiers had agreed on an amending formula unanirnously, but one 
province said no. As individual premiers tend to seek more individual powers, there is a 
tendency whereby one province will use its position to threaten consensus with a veto to 
leverage more powers for itself, even if doing so should compromise the collective efforts 
and progress made in negotiations. To address this, Trudeau announced his intention to 
change the rule of game, that is to say, the rule of unanimity.99 
This conference dealt with 12 it~ms, 100 and the main topics of the conference can 
be roughly classified into the following four categories; 1) Language rights, 2) Division of 
99 Transcript of the Prime minister's Statement at the First Ministers Conference on 
September 8, 1980, document 800-14/050(1 980), Federal-Provincial conference of frrst 
ministers on the constitution, publications officielles, bibliothèque de la ville de MontréaL 
100 Those items dealt with in the conference are as follows; 1) natural resources and 
inter-provincial trade 2) communication, 3) the Supreme Court, 4) family law, 5) Fisheries, 6) 
offshore resources 7) the equilibration of provincial finances, 8) the Charter of Rights, 9) 
constitutional repatriation and an amendment formula 1 0) financial control, Il) the preamble 
of the constitution, and 12) the Senate. 
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powers, 3) Defmition of nation, 4) Canadian Charter of Rights, which will be discussed in 
order. 101 
Language Rights 
Trudeau argued to entrench the protection of individual rights and official language 
rights in the constitution. Trudeau' s aim was not to recognize the Québec as nation, but rather 
to integrate every citizen in Canada on an equal footing as Canadian. lt would require making 
Quebecers personally identify with the Canadian federal government, as opposed to the 
Québec provincial government. The official language policy was important in promoting this 
aim. Trudeau expected that the policy would enable French-speaking peoples to live ali over 
Canada because they would receive public services in French such as public education in 
French where numbers warrant. 
lt was the premiers of Ontario and New Brunswick that agreed with the language 
policy. William Davis, the premier of Ontario, stated that Ontario was ready to work on 
bilingual policy on its own initiative in order to promote Canadian unity. New Brunswick, 
which has the most French-speaking citizens next to Québec (approximately 30%), was in 
101 The following arguments in the federal-provincial constitutional conference of 1980 is 
based on the document of Federal-Provincial conference of frrst ministers on the constitution, 
publications officielles, bibliothèque de la ville de Montréal, document 800-14/050 (1 980). 
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favor of the official language policy. Richard Hatfield (premier of the province) stated that 
the respect for two-language policy bas a good effect on promotion of the recognition of 
collective rights. 
However, the other provinces kept distance from the language policy. Especially 
the western provinces, where few French speaking people live, were generally opposed to the 
federal language policy. Although Allan Williams (attorney general of British Columbia) 
stated that British Columbia was going to actively work on the preservation of the French 
speaking minority, he was opposed to the language policy being forced by the constitution. 
Sterling Lyon (premier of Manitoba) stated that fundamental rights and the democratie rights 
of individuals are different from language rights, and thus they should not be protected 
equally. Allan Blakeney (premier of Saskatchewan) stated that the introduction of language 
rights into the constitution resembled 'a political bargaining' . 
René Lévesque also was opposed to the official bilingual policy tabled by federal 
government. Regarding the language law, the Parti Québécois government has enacted a 
language policy act called Bill 101 in 1977. Québec had defended its position of promoting 
French unilingualism as opposed to bilingualism. According to Lévesque, Québec is a unique 
society, having a different frrst language than the rest of North America, and thus Quebecers 
shou ld be defined as a nation with its center as Québec territory. The primary government in 
the minds of many Quebecers is the Québec government rather than the Canadian one, and 
57 
therefore, it is not appropriate to criticize the fact that their chief concem is the preservation 
of the French language in their own national territory. 
Trudeau criticized Lévesque's remarks saying that following the reasoning of the 
Québec govemment, the survival of the French speaking population is deemed to be 
contingent upon their existence within Québec, while the French speaking minorities outside 
of Québec would be unable to survive. If the French language were to be established as being 
the exclusive domain of Québec province only, Canada would be divided into two parts. In 
that scenario, this would lead to eventually opting out of Canada to become independent state. 
Against this case Trudeau proposed another vision of Canada in which the federal 
govemment regards negotiation with Québec government as an important feature of its 
govemance. His logic is based on the understanding that the treatment of minorities bas been 
shawn to be a crucial aspect in the integrity of civility of countries. The reason that 
Switzerland is successful despite being composed of four nationalities is that the majority 
recognizes the rights of minorities and makes concessions to them. From this viewpoint, the 
provision in the language law enacted by the Québec government saying that only English 
parents born in Québec have the rights to send their children to English public school should 
be rewritten to the provision that every English Canadian living in Canada have the right to 
send their children to public English school. Finally, Trudeau stated that the best way to 
preserve the French linguistic minority was in making the constitution obligate provincial 
governments to preserve those minorities. The best vision for Canada is to make a country 
where French-speaking people feel at home everywhere. 
58 
In response to Trudeau's remark, Lévesque replied that, even under the French 
language act (the Charter ofthe French language), the English minority does not feel that it is 
in danger. While in fact, the English minority in Québec already enjoys protection and it 
therefore does not need constitutional protection, the French minority living outside of 
Québec is in a precarious situation, with few effective legal protections. Under these 
circumstances outlined in the argument, he described Trudeau's language policy as neither 
logical nor applicable. Trudeau's vision he said, wherein the French-speaking minority would 
come to think of ail of Canada as their home, might sound appealing, but one must always 
consider the realism of such visions, and Trudeau's ideas, he said, are just not applicable. In 
addition, he pointed out the dangers of the heavy-handed implementation of such visions 
upon population. An ideal which has its origin at a lower level of the democratie system is 
inherently better, which relies on the formation of consent from below up. In other words, 
according to Lévesque, provincial leve) measures on minority language rights are inherently 
more ' democratie' and therefore better. Considering the fact that at the time, only two 
provinces (New Brunswick and Ontario) were in favor of the language policy proposed by 
federal government, Trudeau's language policy is not sufficient for being called a common 
idea yet. Therefore, even if it is inserted in the constitution, it is natural that the practicability 
of it would become a problem. 
Next, we would like to examine the topics of division of powers at this conference. 
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The division of powers 
The premiers of Ontario and New Brunswick were in favor of the plan proposed by 
federal govemment. William Davis, the premier of Ontario, stated that although Ontario 
regards the idea of the regional development as important, the formation of strong economie 
union within Canada is required as a primary means of ensuring a stronger, united Canada. 
Hatfield, the premier of New Brunswick, did not demand a change in the division of powers, 
arguing that maintaining a balance between the federal and provincial governments is 
important. 
However, most of the other English provmces argued about their rights to 
administer natural resources found within their provincial territory. The attorney general of 
British Colombia stated that energy, transportation, and industrial policy are required for 
making a strong British Co lombia. Allan Blakeney, the premier of Saskatchewan, demanded 
the right to tax resource goods and the right to have a say in deciding the rate at which they 
would be produced. The premiers of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland demanded the right to 
control their natural resources as weil. 
As these examples suggest, most provincial governments' demands were based on 
their provincial interests. However, ali of them with the exception of Québec have agreed 
one important topic, that being, the definition of the term ' nation' . 
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Defmition ofNation 
Although most of provincial govemments in attendance tabled arguments 
regarding their own domestic concerns, ail of the provincial governments except Québec 
seemed able to reach a consensus on the question of one nation for Canada. William Davis 
(the premier of Ontario) stated that " ... now is the just time when we should entrench 
democratie rights and freedom which leave no room for discussion in written constitution in 
order to preserve our people, and it is the progress from the viewpoint of Ontario province". 
Moreover, William Davis stated that the aim of Canadian constitution is to confirm what is 
best and the most dynamic within Canadian nation, to protect minority rights, and strengthen 
the economie union of the country. These things prove Canadian citizenship as people and 
solidarity as nation. Connecting us with fundamental princip les, that is, the Charter of Rights, 
means that Canadian will be joined to each other as a people, and as a nation . 
The premiers of Manitoba and Saskatchewan were opposed to the entrenchment 
of the Charter of Rights into the Canadian constitution on the grounds th at the entrenchment 
of the Charter wou Id result in shifting the legislative authority from Parliament to the courts, 
which would amount to a constitutional revolution entail ing the relinquishment of the 
essential princip le of Parliamentary dernocracy, the princip le of Parliamentary supremacy. 102 
However, they agreed with the idea of promoting the formation of a nation in Canada. For 
102 Kenneth McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada, op.cit, 167. 
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example, Sterling Lyon, the premter of Manitoba, stated that although Manitoba bas a 
different opinion about sorne matters like the Charter of Rights, it is going to collaborate 
positively in the history of a nation. Blakeney, the premier of Saskatchewan stated, 
"Aithough we have various differences between the regions, these differences are supported 
on the assumption that we are citizen in a united Canada". Angus Mclean, the premier of 
Prince Edward Island, declared that he bas a great attachment to Canada as a nation as weil as 
having pride in his province. 
However, conceming the topic of a Canadian nation, René Lévesque expressed 
quite a different opinion from the other premiers. Lévesque argued that Canadian 
Confederation was formed from two equal nations, the English and the French, ' Le Canada 
est composé de deux nations égales entre elles,' 103 wh ile the other provinces agreed on 
theory of a single nation. 
The Charter of Rights 
Conceming the entrenchment of the Charter of Rights, most provinces with the 
exception of Ontario and New Brunswick, were opposed because they feared that the 
103 Positions du Québec dans les domaines constitutionnel et intergouvernemental, op.cit., 
57. 
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entrenchment of the Charter would lead to shifting the locus of the decision-making power 
from parliament to the Supreme Court. Moreover, Peter Lougheed, (the premier of Alberta) 
stated that sin ce in Canada, at that ti me, a lm ost ali of the provinces had the ir own Charter of 
Rights, the entrenchment of the Canadian Charter would !essen the significance of each 
provincial Charter of Rights. According to him, the fundamental rights of Canadians are 
defended by each provincial charter of rights and thus, they are not in danger. Allan Williams 
of British Columbia, stated that the entrenchment of the Charter of Rights into a constitution 
would restrict the freedom of Canadians rather than to strengthen it. In Canadian federal 
documents, the rights oflife, liberty, and safety are described as the most fundamental three 
rights, however, when it cornes down to who gets to interpret what these rights mean, judicial 
courts, not legislators, would decide concretely what these rights entail. Therefore, according 
to Williams, the defect of the entrenchment of the Canadian Charter is that the exact and 
concrete definition of what these freedoms entai) is very difficult to ascertain. In the present 
Canadian system, when citizens collectively realize that if the current system of rights is 
mistaken vis-à-vis their own values, they can seek a revision through the provincial 
legislature and federal parliament. A one-shot solution (such as the entrenchment of a charter) 
to a complex, ever-shifting moral landscape is inherently too rigid and incapable of 
addressing these discrepancies. In effect, what has resulted from the entrenchment of the 
Charter is that while the federal government sirnply airned at establishing a moral 
codification of freedoms that already existed in Canada, the actual effect was to sacrifice 
Canadian parliamentary democratie traditions to this moral codification. 
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René Lévesque, the premier of Québec has been very clear about the problems of 
the entrenching of the Charter of Rights. Here, we would like to examine a document titled 
"The position of the Québec govemment about the Charter ofRights" issued in July 1980.104 
In this document, the Québec government made its position clear in its commitment to 
preserve fundamental human rights. The document said that Quebecers unanimously 
supported fundamental freedoms such as the freedom of religion, thought, free speech and 
free press, and fundamental democratie principles such as popular suffrage, elections every 
four or five years, as weil as parliamentary sessions held every year. These rights are already 
established and respected in Québec. Therefore, the area conceming the constitutional 
Charter of Rights proposed by federal government is not that Québec is not adequately 
concemed with defending the rights of its citizen, but rather, that it seeks an optimal means of 
providing those protections. When the individual rights are entrenched in the constitution, the 
following three points must be considered. The first point is wh ether the entrenchment of the 
Charter is the best way to defend the rights or not. The second point is whether the rights 
treated in the Charter represent the values common to every Canadian or not. Finally, the 
tbird point is wh ether the meaning and range of the rights are full y defined or not. 
Then the Québec govemment compares the advantages with disadvantages of 
Charter entrenchment. The first ad van tage pointed out is that the entrenchment of the Charter 
104 The Charter of Rights: Quebec' s Position in Meeting of the continuing committee of 
ministers on the constitution (Toronto: Library and Archives Canada, 1980). 
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can protect the individual rights firmly because any organization (including any legislature) 
cannot violate the principles included in the Charter. The second advantage is that courts 
regard an entrenched Charter as more valuable than a Charter based merely on parliamentary 
legislation. The third advantage is that the ceremony involved with the entrenchment process 
has symbolic significance, and finally, the fourth advantage is that the entrenchment of the 
Charter can defend fun dam entai and individual rights uniformly across the who le of Canada. 
As for the disadvantages, the first one is that the entrenchment of the Charter may 
encroach on the rights of the provincial government to legislate, depending on the number 
and the variety of rights included in the Canadian Charter. 
The second disadvantage is that the entrencbment of the Charter leads to a 
"government of judges", that is, "the rule of judges," which doesn ' t constitute the most 
democratie means for the preservation of rigbts. Rights and freedoms are far reaching and are 
in a constant state of evolution. The entrenchment of the Charter into the constitution 
necessarily complicates and obstructs this evolution, depriving the elected assembly of the 
power to adapt rights according to democratie principles. The responsibility for guaranteeing 
rights shifts from the elected representatives to appointed judges. The Canadian political 
system is based on representation and sovereignty in legislation, and therefore, the shift from 
legislative powers to the courts deprive citizens of the ir most effective means of influencing 
the development of individual rights. In this respect, Lévesque indicated an important point, 
being tbat rights, in fact, are wide-ranging and continuously undergoing change and evolution. 
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From this viewpoint, imposing a temporally contingent definition of rights through the 
entrenchment of the Charter is not the right ki nd of approach to address the definition of the 
rights. What is noteworthy in this discussion is that the democratie process whereby citizens, 
through their elected representatives engage in the formation of their rights, is a right in and 
of itself. 
Regarding the third disadvantage, Lévesque argued that the wider the range of the 
rigbts gets, the bigger the second problem (the judicialization of politics) indicated above 
grows. He cited as an example, the mobility rights in Canada proposed by the federal 
government. 105 Generally, the signiflcance of these rights is not opposed by anyone. 
However, if the meaning, implication, and range of rights are considered, there may be 
differences of opinion between the Québec and others on these rights despite agreement in 
principle, because the application of this right may violate the jurisdictional rights of the 
Québec government to control the qualifications of professional occupations. It is a very 
important point of contention, because in Québec where most of the citizens are French 
speaking, the qualification system for lawyers and doctors is different from the one of other 
provinces. Since the qualification requirements in Québec are stricter than other provinces, it 
may conflict with the rights of mobility in Canada. Moreover, inclusion of the rights of 
mobility into the constitution may cause the standardization of the educational system ali 
105 This right is entrenched in section 6 of the Constitutional Act, 1982. See Section 6 of 
Constitution Act, 1982, Peter W. Hogg, Constitutiona/ Law of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 
2010), A-38. 
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over Canada, because differences between provincial systems may be interpreted by the 
courts as a barrier to mobility. In this case, Québec have to set in motion the process of 
amending the federal constitution in which tlus right bad been entrenched, however this is 
likely far more difficult than it might initially seem because the Québec bas to obtain consent 
of other provinces in order to meet the conditions necessary for constitutional amendment 
(resolutions of the legislative assemblies of at !east two-thirds of the provinces106). 
Language rights were the item that the Québec government was the most opposed to 
m the entrenchment of the Charter. Once language rights become entrenched in the 
constitution, it becomes impossible to revise provisions about language policy. However, if 
such a case were to arise under the Charter, Québec wou id need to obtain the consent of ali 
the other provinces even regarding its own language policy to make revisions. lt becomes 
obvious, th en, that the real aim of the language po licy proposed by the federal government is 
to modify the Québec's language law for reasons related to the individual freedom of choice 
regarding the language of education. According to Lévesque, no constitution can change the 
convictions and attitudes of people and force the provincial government to take the measures 
against its faith. Even though the general provision for minority protection is tightened, it is 
impossible to actually change the fate of linguistic minorities unless there is the actual 
political will to do so. Therefore, only concrete policies adopted for regional particularities 
106 Section 38(b) of Constitution Act , 1982, Peter W. Hogg, Constitutiona/ Law ofCanada 
(Toronto: Carswell, 2010), A-48. 
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can actually improve the status of minorities. Proof of this can be found in the fact that 
English-speaking citizens in Québec are offered better conditions than language minorities in 
any other province. Finally, the Québec government cited the following suggestions from the 
Pepin-Roberts commission as one of the best ideas for minority protection. The report 
suggests that provincial policy should seek to legislate on the subject of minority protection, 
white considering the diversity that exists in its various regions. From these legislative efforts, 
and in conjunction with similar projects undertaken in other provinces, if in that case, it is 
possible that when a consensus between provinces is formed on the appropriate treatment of 
minorities, such common clauses could then be taken up into a constitutional framework as 
the natural conclusion of a greater democratie process. 107 
What is interesting about Lévesque's statement is that he has a completely different 
perspective of rights from Trudeau. According to Trudeau, rights be long to the people and are 
fundamental rights, and it naturally follows to believe that they should be entrenched in a 
constitution. This perspective is characteristic of modern individualism. John Locke said in 
107 Original text of the report connected with this argument is as follows. "In our opinion, the 
protection of linguistic rights at the provincial leve) can be treated, at this time, in either one 
or two ways: extending the constitutional guarantees of Section 133 to every or to sorne 
provinces, or removing these guarantees, inviting the provinces to legislate safeguards for 
their minorities, taking into account the diversity of local situations, with the hope that a 
consensus between the provinces might form on a common denominator which eventua lly 
cou Id be included within the constitution of the country. After due consideration, we now 
think that the second option would be wiser and more likely to be successful in the long run, 
involve Jess confrontation, and be more in agreement with the spirit of the federal system". 
The Task Force on Canadian Unity: Future Together Observation and Recommendations 
(Ottawa: Canadian government Publ ishing Centre, 1979), 52. 
68 
his Two Treatises of Government that each individual formed the State to protect the mu tuai 
preservation of his !ife, liberty, and property, making a contract with each other. "And it is 
not without reason, that he seeks out, and is willing to join in Society with others who are 
already united, or have a mind to unite for the mutual Preservation of their Lives, Liberties 
and Estates, which I cali by the general Name, Property." 108 Such natural rights are 
fondamental to political order and inherently belong to human beings. As is weil known, 
Lockean idea has influenced on the Declaration of Independence of the United States of 
America. Thus, Trudeau also is greatly influenced by Thomas Jefferson. Trudeau stated that 
absolute and eternal value should be accorded to basic principles such as liberty and 
democracy rather than the political structures, citing the following words of Jefferson saying 
"Nothing theo is unchangeable but the inherent and unalienable rights of man." 109 Therefore, 
Trudeau' s idea that these rights should be entrenched in fundamentallaw is clear reflection of 
Lockean and Jefferson's political thought. 
In contrast, Lévesque did not deny that rights are important. However, rights are not 
fixed by a single decision, but are rather made or remade continually in the process of 
discussion known as parliamentary deliberation. Therefore, it is desirable that the debate take 
place in a healthy political context whereby the individual is effectively interwoven into the 
108 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government; edited by Peter Laslette (1960) Cambridge 
University Press, 350. 
109 Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Federalism and the French Canadians, (Montreal: Macmillan, 
1967), 53. 
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political process. ln such a case, each person can participate in the making of their own 
individual rights. Therefore, it is more desirable that provincial governments maintain their 
own charters of the human rights and freedoms, such as the Québec Charter of Human rights 
and freedoms, which is preferable to entrenching the Charter into the federal Canadian 
constitution. According to Lévesque, charters established at the provincial level already 
protect fundamental rights such as the freedom of expression and the freedom of religion. 
Therefore, he argued that the human rights of Canadian citizens can be effectively protected 
providing that the provincial charter mode! be reproduced nationwide. Keeping this in mind, 
why is it then that the federal government intends to entrench the Charter into the 
constitution? Lévesque revealed that the true intention of the federal govemment was not in 
protecting the rights of Canadian citizens, but in strengthening federal powers. 11 0 
ln sum, Lévesque criticized the federal government for intending to centralize the 
Canadian federation by entrenching the Charter. As an alternative model, Lévesque proposed 
decentralizing the federation . The idea of decentralization is especially important for Québec 
because Québec has a distinct culture regarding its language differences, its unique history, 
and values different from other provinces with English-speaking majorities. In response, 
Trudeau argued that Lévesque's idea of decentralization should be feared because eventually 
it could ' break up' Canada. According to Trudeau, the one value that should be the long-term 
110 Lévesque René, Transcript of Mr. René Lévesque's Remarks on the Charter of Rights, in 
federal-provincial conference of the .first ministers on the constitution, publications 
officielles (Montréal: Bibliotheque de la vi lle de Montréal, 1980). 
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objective is Canadian unity, and 10 this aim the Charter would play a pivotai role as a 
keystone of national unity. 
In the end, it can be found from the inter-governmental discussions held in the 1980 
constitutional conference that Trudeau and Lévesque have expressed widely divergent views 
on the State. While Trudeau has expressed the view of Canada as a national state, Lévesque 
has maintained the view of Canada as a multinational state. Ontario and New Brunswick 
from the beginning took sides with the federal government led by Trudeau. lt was true that 
sorne English provinces, especially the four western provinces, and the Québec province had 
similarities in that they opposed to the entrenchment of the Canadian Charter on the ground 
that it caused the judicialization of politics. However, the most important difference between 
the four western provinces and Québec is that these four provinces and the other English 
provinces viewed Canada as a nation state. Every English province ultimately took a position 
in support ofCanadian unity under a single nation, while stating the importance of individual 
and provincial equality. Concerning the protection of individual rights, the western provinces 
were opposed to the entrenchment of the Charter of Rights into the constitution, but they 
were not opposed to the protection of individual rights per se. 
Claude Ryan of the Québec liberal party (a Québec federalist), advocated for a 
federal system that was different from Trudeau's idea of federalism and recognized the 
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special status of Québec in Canada (ln 1980, ~an proposed the policy on constitutional 
reform titled 'A new Canadian federation ' as the position of the Québec Liberal party 111 ) . 
However, in our opinion, conceming the role of the State, Ryan could not endorse the view 
that the State should provide adequately collective rights to the Québec nation . The reason of 
it was that Ryan 's position remained a version of federalism based on modern liberal 
individualism. For example, during the discussion about the enactment of the Charter of the 
French Language, he insisted on the superiority of the Québec Charter of the Rights and 
Freedoms over the Québec Charter of the French Language in order to emphasize the priority 
of the individual rights over collective rights.11 2 
However, against the Trudeau' s view of the State, Lévesque ' s view of the State 
was quite different. Lévesque didn ' t abandon his view of the multinational State whereby 
Canada consists of two nations, and should therefore afford a greater degree of political 
autonomy to Québec, eventually leading to his position of advocating the idea of confederal 
union, that is, sovereignty-association platform. Thus, in this constitutional conference, there 
was already conflicting views on the appropriate position for Québec to take versus the 
federal government and the English provinces. However, at this stage, Québec was still allied 
with English provinces except Ontario and New Brunswick regarding the expansion of 
111 Quebec Liberal Party, A New Canadian Federation: the constitutional committee of the 
Quebec Liberal Party, (1980). 
11 20livier Mareil, La raison et L'équilibre: Libéralisme, nationalisme et catholicisme dans la 
pensée de Claude Ryan au Devoir (1962-1978) (Montréal: Éditions Varia, 2002), 213. 
72 
provincial powers. Therefore, the federal and provincial governments did not reach consensus 
by the end of this constitutional conference. Th us, Trudeau gave up on making an agreement 
with provinces and set about achieving unilateral repatriation of the constitution. 
2.3 The political situation after the 1980 constitutional conference. 
On 2nd of October, 1982, Trudeau announced in a television program that the 
federal govemment would unilaterally repatriate the constitution and pursue the entrenchment 
of the Charter. As Peter Russell, a well-known political scientist of Canada points out, 
Trudeau spoke directly to the people over the heads of provincial premiers.11 3 Canadians, 
according to Trudeau, are those Canadians who owe their primary allegiance to Canada and 
his central institutions. Needless to say, there was no room for recognizing the special status 
for Québec within the Canadian federation . 
In opposition to Trudeau' s remark, Lévesque sought to adopt a unammous 
resolution for denouncing Trudeau 's unilateral repatriation formula in the National Assembly 
113 Peter H. Russell, Constitutional Odyssey: Can Canadians Become a Sovereign People ? 
(2004) University of Toronto Press, 111. 
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of Québec. At that time, Lévesque showed a flexible attitude, being ready to make 
concessions to Ryan (the leader of Québec liberal party), in order to achieve consensus on 
this important resolution. However, Lévesque remained opposed to Ryan's proposed 
'exchange condition' where if Lévesque recognized the advantages offederalism Ryan would 
approve the resolution, and they were not therefore able to reach an agreement. 11 4 
Afterwards, federal government unilaterally advanced the process of constitutional 
repatriation in the House of Commons and agreement was nearly on the question of 
constitutional repatriation. Upon hearing this news, the eight provinces except Ontario and 
New Brunswick were rushed to make their own new constitutional amendment formula, and 
as such, the premier of Alberta proposed new constitutional amendment formula later called 
the Vancouver formula. 
Next, eight provinces (with the exception of Ontario and New Brunswick) formed an 
alternative plan for repatriating the constitution on the 161h of April, 1981. This plan offered 
two conditions for repatriation. The first condition was that most constitutional amendments 
would require agreement between the federal and provincial governments representing 
two-thirds of the population. Second, provinces would have been able to opt out from any 
114 Graham Fraser, René Lévesque and the Parti Québécois in power (Montreal/Kingston: 
McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001), 258-260. 
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amendments, transferring their powers to the federal government and would receive financial 
compensation. Due to the inclusion of the second condition, the plan was favored by Québec. 
Moreover, the eight provinces brought a constitutional action against the unilateral 
repatriation of the federal government. The Supreme Court of Canada ruling essentially 
maintained that while unjlateral repatriation is not unconstitutional, it is against Canadian 
political conventions. As the result of it, eight provinces (minus Québec) weakened the 
resistance to Trudeau because they felt it difficult to oppose the federal plan. Lévesque 
wanted to counter Trudeau's plan by sorne means or other and he introduced a resolution 
against federal unilateral repatriation in the National Assembly once again, on September 29, 
1981. This time, Ryan agreed with the resolution. 
Wbile Jean Chrétien, then minister of Justice announced the victory of federal 
government for the reason that the Supreme Court judged the conduct of federal government 
legally constitutional but politically illegitimate, Trudeau felt the need to obtain the consent 
of the provinces once more and decided to hold another federal-provincial constitutional 
conference in November 1981. 115 This conference took place during five days from the 3rd 
to 8th ofNovember at the Ottawa Convention Centre. In the following chapter, we would like 
11 5 Ibid., 279-287. 
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to examine the difference in concept of rights between Trudeau and Lévesque in more detail, 
focusing on the argument between them in the federal-provincial constitutional conference of 
1981. 
CHAPTER ill 
THE RESULT OF THE CONFLICT IN CONCEPTIONS OF RIGHTS: THE 
FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE OF 1981 
3.1 The conflict between Trudeau' s and Lévesque's conceptions of rights 
On the 3rd ofNovember, Trudeau outlined two points about his plan of repatriation 
in his opening statement. The first one was that he intended to carry out repatriation at any 
cost. The second one was about finding common ground regarding the formu la of 
constitutional amendment. The first point was not problematic because every province could 
agree on the fact that Canada needed to repatriate its constitution. The second point, however, 
was met with more controversy. In fact, René Lévesque in his statement objected that the 
problem was not with the fact that the constitution needed to be repatriated, but rather he 
objected to entrenching the Charter into the constitution . A one-time decision to entrench the 
Charter into the constitution would result in a situation where many political questions 
belonging to the legislature would be determined by unelected courts. Rights need to be 
continuously modified to stay relevant to changing patterns of thought, action and overall 
political context. 
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Lévesque denied Trudeau's argument that the demands of provinces for more 
powers had caused the failure of the repatriation so far. ln fact, the plan that he, and seven 
other provincial premiers had proposed on 16 April of 1981 , said nothing about demands for 
more powers. Regardless, Trudeau rejected the plan and Lévesque pointed out that the true 
aim of the federal government was to weaken the powers of provincial assembly through 
entrenching the Charter into constitution. Lévesque said as follows: 
Les droits que possède ce parlement, ce sont en fait les droits collectifs de tous les 
Québécois, ils sont comme les droits de tous les peuples, inaltérables et ne peuvent 
pas être limités sans consentement. 11 6 
Though there was a serious conflict of opinion between the federal government 
(allied with Ontario and New Brunswick) and the other eight provinces including Québec, the 
situation dramatically changed from that point. On the aftemoon of the 3 ofNovember 1981 , 
Trudeau gathered members of his Cabinet and discussed the proposai of the provincial 
governments with them. There, they decided that they would put the question to the Canadian 
public by holding a referendum on the Charter of Rights, where the Victoria and Vancouver 
formula (advocated by the federal government and the eight provincial governments 
respectively), in order to resolve the issue. 
116 Allocution de M. René Lévesque Premier ministre du Québec, Lundi le 2 novembre, 
conférence fédérale-provinciale des premiers ministres sur la constitution, Document 
800-15/015(1981), publications officielles, bibliothèque de la ville de Montréal. 
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On the aftemoon of the 41h of November, Allan Blakeney, (the premter of 
Saskatchewan) proposed a new amendment formula, which Lévesque was vehemently 
opposed to, because under this formula Québec would have !ost its veto and the right to opt 
out. After this discussion, Trudeau again introduced the plan to hold a referendum to 
provincial premiers. The plan stated that if within the next two years the provincial 
govemments could not reach an agreement among themselves, the issue would be put to a 
national referendum. The provincial premiers, with the exception of Lévesque, were opposed 
to that plan because they disliked the procedure of referendum on the grounds that it ran 
contrary to princip les of parliamentary democracy. Lévesque was also skeptical of this plan, 
but was also concemed about the possibility of losing his alliance with other premiers. 
Afterwards, the real content of the plan was revealed, and according to it, if Trudeau's bill 
were passed in the House of Commons, it would be sent to British parliament and would only 
ask whether the provinces accepted the bill along with the referendum. Naturally, Lévesque 
was greatly angered by the plan. 117 
After the third day of the conference, while delegates from Québec (including 
Lévesque) went back to their Hotel in Gatineau, the representatives from seven English 
117 Graham Fraser, René Lévesque and the Parti Québécois in power, op.cit., 294-296. 
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provinces remained in Ottawa because they were scheduled to stay at the Chateau-Laurier 
Hotel facing the conference center. During the night, in the kitchen of the Château-Laurier 
Hotel, Jean Chrétien (then minister of Justice) proposed to the seven provinces (excluding 
Québec) to put a ' notwithstanding' clause into the Charter. By using this clause, the 
provinces and the federal governrnent could legislate against the Charter. However, using this 
clause would have to be in compliance with two conditions. The frrst one is that this clause 
cannot be used against democratie rights such as the right of mobility and minority language 
rights, and the second one is that if this clause is not reenacted, it would expire in five years. 
This was the concession to the western provinces, which were opposed to the entrenchment 
of the Charter ofRights. 
Another part of Chrétien's proposai was about the formula of constitutional 
amendment. According to it, most constitutional amendments would require agreement 
between the federal governrnent and two-thirds of the provinces representing 50 percent of 
the population. This formula was identical to the one proposed on 16th of April, except for 
the provision that one province can opt out the transfer of powers to federal govemment with 
economie compensation, which was deleted. Therefore, in this plan Québec !oses its veto. 
Seven of the provinces (except Québec) came to an agreement on Chrétien's plan, 
and René Lévesque was isolated. The Trudeau govemment felt satisfied from having 
achieved a leve! of consensus, and submitted this federal plan to the House of Commons in 
December of 1981. After the plan was passed by the House of Commons the federal 
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govemment decided to submit this plan to the English Parliament in March, 1982, and finally, 
in April 1982, Queen Elizabeth II formally signed the constitution. The political struggle 
around the 1982 Constitution ended in victory for Trudeau. 
After enactment of the 1982 constitution, Lévesque government sought to apply the 
notwithstanding clause of the constitution to ali the laws of Québec, which is achieved 
through the enactment of the omnibus law, preventing ali laws of Québec from the 
application of many provisions of the Canadian Charter, through the notwithstanding 
clause.11 8 This effort is representative ofLévesque' s resistance against the enactment of 1982 
constitution, and against Trudeau. 
In the constitutional conference of 1980, Lévesque insisted that the right of the 
National Assembly of Québec to legislate on its own is a collective right. On the other hand, 
Trudeau insisted on the supremacy of individual rights and their entrenchment in the 
constitution. 
As we mentioned above, the thinking underlying Trudeau' s political philosophy is 
the primacy of individual rights. In an interview, he stated that although he respected the idea 
118 André Binette, «Le pouvoir dérogatoire de l'article 33 de la Charte canadienne des droits 
et libertés et la structure de la Constitution du Canada », dans la revue du Barreau (numéro 
spécial, 2003), 118. 
Loi concernant la loi constitutionnelle de 1982, ch. L-4.2,L.R.Q. 
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of community, he respected the sovereignty of individuals composing the community much 
more. According to him, the entrenchment of the Charter was the most important subject that 
he had been considering before he went into politics. " 1 wanted to make a just society and a 
democratie society. If the majority govems the minority in the country, province, or the city, 
we cannot have a just society. Therefore, l thought it indispensable to adopt the Charter of 
Rights in order to complete the democratie society of Canada and make the Canadiao 
1° d 0 0 11 9, par tament an tts mterests. 
As the above-mentioned shows, Trudeau argued that universal iodividualism and 
the promotion of one political Canadian identity for the purpose of Canadian unity, rather 
than an idea of French or English Canadians should be the priority. However, the Québec 
goveromeot has enacted its own Charter ofRights that respects individual rights. 
In the 1980 and 1981 federal-provincial constitutional conferences, Lévesque' s 
original thinking about rights was revealed, though he has already expressed his thought in an 
article on the complementarity between individual rights and collective rights in 1978. 
According to him, individual liberalism is important because without individual liberty a 
society becomes like a concentration camp. Though this has been true, in an era that has since 
elapsed, the collective or communitarian aspect of liberty also, that is, the 'group' aspect of 
liberty and rights has developed. The relation between individual rights and collective rights 
119 Cité libre,« Entretien avec Pierre Elliott Trudeau», (vol.26 nol , 1998), op.cit., 99. 
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needs to be oriented to greater complementarity. White Québec governments have always 
paid respect for individual rights and liberty, it is not easy to "draw exact boundary tine for 
individual rights. Th us, Lévesque agreed with the remarks of the Supreme Court of Canada, 
saying " Qu'il est peu de concepts aussi galvaudés, parce qu 'aussi peu précis, que celui des 
libertés fondamentales, des droits de l'homme ou autres expressions analogues" 120 
Lévesque gave a document from the European convention on Human Rights as 
evidence of the existence of a document adopted for the purpose of protecting collective 
rights in a complementary manner without denying individual rights as a consequence. He 
accepted that there also was a difference between individual rights and collective rights. 
Essentially, fundamental rights such as civil rights and political rights can be carried out 
immediately. That is, any individual whose fundamental rights were infringed upon can 
appeal to court in arder to ask for the restoration of the ir rights. On the other band, collective 
rights are essentially more evolutionary than individual rights. Since collective rights, such as 
social, economie, and cultural rights tend to assume a general form of statements of rights 
and principle, it is necessary to make them take a concrete form in arder to guarantee the 
realization. As this is the case, it is first necessary to materialize abstract and general 
'collective rights' by means of legislation and a suitable plan of action. 
120 René Lévesque, René Lévesque: Textes et Entrevues 1960-1987 Textes colligés par 
Michel Lévesque en collaboration avec Rachel Casaubon (Montréal: Presses de l'Université 
du Québec, 1991), 239-241. 
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From another viewpoint, collective rights can provide a basic foundation for a wider 
system of individual rights, and thus be the minimum of object, ensuring that individual 
rights do not result in being meaningless. In this way, individual rights and collective rights 
can mutually complement each other because, if they are effectively adopted, they can 
promote fundamental rights of individuals and extend their rights to every citizen.121 
Lévesque cited Bill 101, Québec' s Language Act, as an example of a law that 
advances individual rights. In clarifying his reasoning, he gave the example of language 
conflict in Belgium. The text of the European Convention on Human Rights that was adopted 
in 1950 provides for the right to not be denied an education and the right for parents to have 
their children educated in accordance with their religious and other views. In the case of 
Belgium, in the north area where Flemish is spoken, they have public education only in 
Flemish, and in the south area where French is spoken, they have the public education only in 
French. However, both the Supreme Court of Belgium and the Commission of Human Rights 
concluded that restrictions on languages in Belgium' s education system do not run contrary 
to the European Convention on Human Rights.122 
In fact, every Belgian and their children living in the Flemish areas have the right to 
an education in Flemish without any distinctions. The same can be said for every French 
121 Ibid., 243 . 
122 Ibid., 245. 
84 
speaker living in French area. In sum, the right to education adopted in the European 
Convention on Human Rights is interpreted not as the right for each individuals of Belgium 
to receive the education in their language, but more fundamentally as the right for each 
society the means to provide every child with public and free education to do so. 123 Based on 
the above-mentioned ruling, Lévesque maintained the legitimacy of the Charter of the French 
language as follows. For him, it is quite normal to respect everyone' s rights by relating them 
to everyone exclusively with public education in French language in Québec on the condition 
that everyone has the same rights, and it matches weil with the guidelines for fundamental 
. h 124 ng ts. 
To sum up Lévesque' s thinking, while fundamental rights such as civil rights and 
political rights essentially are to be required immediately, collective rights require that they 
become substantiated by the means of legislation. This means that there is no absolute and 
universal right (the kind for which Trudeau argued), but are rather made by legislators and 
legislative bodies in a particular ti me and context. In other words, rights cannot be just if they 
are held to be independent of the legislative process. 
123 
"The right to education guaranteed by the ftrst sentence of Article 2 of the Protocol by its 
very nature calls for regulation by the State, regulation that may vary in tirne and place 
according to needs and resources of the cornmunity and of individuals. lt goes without saying 
that such regulation must never injure the substance of the right to education nor conflict with 
other rights enshrined in the Convention". CASE "RELATING TO CERTAIN ASPECTS OF 
THE LA WS ON THE USE OF LANGUAGES IN EDUCATION IN BELGIUM" v. 
BELGIUM (MERITS), European court of human rights, 1968. 
124 Ibid., 246. 
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From Lévesque' s remarks in the following 1980 and 1981 federal constitutional 
conferences, further development ofLévesque' s thinking can be found . lmportantly, what has 
played an important role in the formation of rights in Québec for a long time has been the 
National Assembly. 1t is here that each individual citizen of Québec can participate in the 
making of his or her own rights. Lévesque held that individual rights do not merely pertain to 
the conduct of each individual, but also to the aspect of participation in the formative process 
of the creation of rights, which for Québec includes the hope and sense of resolution that they 
will be able to continue living in their own culture and language. 
Therefore, one of the problems with the universal individualism underlying 
Trudeau' s thinking is that he only allowed for the inclusion of universal individual rights. 
lronically, how individual rights are realized largely depends on how they are discussed 
within each society. Unless rights are formed in this way, they remain abstract and 
impracticable. This understanding of Lévesque seems to be similar to the Edmund Burke' s 
claim about Human Rights. Burke opposed the idea of the French revolution whereby human 
rights were established in an absolute manner, and insisted that they should be made and 
remade through laws as concrete goods in complicated and changeable society. 125 Burke 
wrote as fo llows, "Government is not made in virtue of natural rights, which may and do 
exist in total independence of it. .. . as the liberties and the restrictions vary with times and 
125 Edmund Burke, Rejlections on the Revolution in France Oxford World 's Classics 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 58-62. 
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circumstances, and admit of infinite modifications, they cannot be settled upon abstract rule; 
and nothing is foolish asto discuss them upon that principle."126 
This was the matter in question during the constitutional conflict. According to 
Lévesque, Citizens of Québec who felt themselves being a nation express their individual 
hopes about creating a society worth y of thjs national identity through the legislative process. 
lt is clear that the best method of accommodating this is not the vision of Canada based on 
Trudeau' s idea of a unjtary nation-state, but rather a Canada defmed as a multinational state. 
The dichotomy whereby Québec insists on collective rights while the rest of 
Canada puts emphasis on individual rights based on the Canadian Charter is a popular topic 
among Canadian academies. According to Charles Taylor, English Canadians fear that a 
political society espousing the collective rights may run against the Charter of Rights and 
freedoms, and that collective action may restrict individual behavior and encroach on their 
rights. From their perspective, this fear was already realized by the Québec language 
legislation, Bill 101. English Canadians maintain that espousing collective goals on behalf of 
a national group can be thought to be inherently discriminatory because not ali those living as 
citizens und er a certain jurisdiction will be long to the national group th us favored. 127 
126 Ibid., 60. 
127 Taylor, Reconciling the Solitude, op.cit., 173. 
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However, we can understand that this objection is too simplistic if we consider the 
Lévesque' s statement more carefully. Lévesque thinks that it is the right of the National 
Assembly to legislate not only for collective rights but also for individual rights. That each 
person can participate in making of their own rights is an individual right. A government as 
'near' as possible to the citizen makes this possible, and Lévesque argued that the ability of 
an individual to determine his or her own rights is an individual right. Wbat he was opposed 
to is if these rights are deprived from the responsibility of provincial government and 
entrenched into the federal constitution. In that situation, each person cannot participate in the 
making of his or her own rights, but judges at the courts determine these rights. 
ln sum, the issue of this argument is not conflict between individual rights and 
collective rights but a difference in the perception of the rights themselves. As Lévesque ' s 
thinking on rights outlined, they need to be dynamic and changeable and we should make and 
remake rights at various points intime. This idea of rights seems to be consistent with that of 
Burke. Based on this idea, Lévesque defines the rights of each individual to participate in the 
making of his own rights as an individual right which is different from the individualistic 
contents of rights. In addition, because Québec is a distinct society regarding language and 
culture, it is very important that the National Assembly makes laws for its citizens. ln other 
words, this implies that the National Assembly of Québec needs to determine what rights are 
appropriate for its own citizens. To rephrase, it is important to emphasize that the National 
Assembly of Québec bas a role in the survival and development of Québéc society as a nation. 
Lévesque describes the role of the National Assembly as the exercise of collective rights. For 
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example, when Bill 101 was enacted, the discussion in the National Assembly modified the 
original plan (Je projet de loi I 128) of the Parti Québécois proposed by Camille Laurin in 
order to protect the individual rights of citizens. 
Lévesque' s view about rights is related with his view on federalism. As Lévesque's 
view put emphasis on the role of the provincial assembly, his idea about federalism can be 
thought of as a type of decentralized regime. Lévesque insisted on a form of confederation 
called sovereignty-association, but after the 1980 referendum, realizing that Quebecers 
preferred decentralization to sovereignty-association, he leaned towards the decentralization 
of federation. This provoked sorne of the caucus of the Parti Québécois (such as Jacques 
Parizeau) to leave the party. However, Lévesque emphasized the democratie responsibility 
incumbent on politicians to follow the democratie will of the people and that it is important to 
think about the idea of federalism together. His self-identification with democratie ideals can 
also be said to have made him vulnerable to getting caught by Trudeau's trap for a national 
referendum. 
With the repatriation issue as a turning point, Canadian constitutionalism began to 
head towards Trudeau' s idea that places the Charter as the centerpiece of national unity. This 
project sought to overcome national unity crisis by making a Canada with a strong political 
128 Assemblée nationale du Québec, Projet de loi I , Le Devoir, 28 avril 1977. 
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centre, based on modern individualism. In the end, this project provoked the biggest crisis in 
the national unity debate because it enforced the constitution without consent of Québec. 
3.2 The aftermath of the constitutional conflict over rights 
From the latter balf of 1980s to 1990, the Meech Lake and Charlottetown 
accords sought to settle this problem. However, both accords ended in failure . Many social 
scientists proposed the tbeory of asymmetrical federalism as a way of dealing witb the 
argument surrounding both accords, which was proposed as a way of accommodating 
minority nations. This is the same version offederalism that recognizes Québec as a nation in 
the constitution and gives special powers that other provinces do not possess to Québec for 
the purpose of cultural and linguistic survival and development, which is based on the 
grounds that Québec is a distinct nation. Beginning in the 1980' s, the most distinguished 
social scientist fo r promoting the theory of asymmetrical federalism has been Charles Taylor. 
Taylor has been critical of the present version of Canadian federalism with regards to the 
Charter, stating that Canada has become a litigious society, and contended that modem 
individualism atone cannat maintain the diversity of society. Thus, asymmetrical federalism 
that enables individuals to use their own language as the means of communication within 
90 
separate national groups and at the same time communicate with others can be a means of 
stopping social fragmentation. 
Taylor proposed the diversity ofbelonging. For example, Quebecers frrstly belong 
to the community of Québec and through it Quebecers be long to Canada. On the other hand, 
English Canadians belongs directly to Canada. This is referred to as "deep diversity".129 We 
think this way of thinking is an attempt to contain groups that possess their own collective 
goals within a modern state. However, Lévesque's arguments outlined in this master thesis 
are quite different from the Taylor's thinking. Lévesque' s argument was that the Charter of 
Rights should remain at the provinciallevel because it enables each individual to participate 
in the making of his or her own rights, is indicative of the idea that collective rights exist in 
order to protect fully individual rights. Therefore, this thought cannot connect with Taylor's 
thought that since Québec society is a collective society it is different from the rest of 
Canada. 
The constitutional conflict from 1967 to 1982 between Trudeau and Lévesque 
seemed to have ended in Lévesque's defeat. However, as we pointed out in the preceding 
chapter, he enacted the omnibus law to exclu de the influence of the Canadian Charter on laws 
I29 Taylor, Reconciling the Solitudes, op.cit, 181-184. 
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of Québec. Moreover, in working against enactment of the 1982 constitution without the 
consent of Québec, he sought the possibility of enacting an internai constitution of Québec. 
He assigned Morin the task of preparing this constitution between 1982 and 1983. 130 The 
concrete content of the report of 1985 submitted by the committee remained unknown 
because this project was suspended after 1985 when Lévesque resigned. Therefore, it was not 
certain what his thinking was on the Québec Charter of Human Rights and Charter of the 
French Language in the Québec constitution. However, it was clear that he sought to enact 
the constitution as the symbol of national self determination. 13 1 
130 Jacques-Yvan Morin, «Une constitution nouvelle pour le Québec : Le pourquoi, le 
contenu et le comment », dans Revue québécoise de droit constitutionnel volume 2 (2008), 
10. 
131 Daniel Turp, «La constitution québécoise: une perspective historique» dans Revue 
québécoise de droit constitutionnel volume 2 (2008) , 23-25. 
CONCLUSION 
Finally we would like to restate the main findings of this master thesis. The 
research question of this master thesis was to reconsider Taylor's dichotomous viewpoint that 
Québécois society has more "collectivist" tendencies, and where the rest of Canada is framed 
as a more "liberal individualistic" society. Here again we would like to state Taylor' s 
argument for confmnation. While citizens in the rest of Canada are united around the 
principle of procedural liberalism (a view that individual rights must always come first and 
must take precedence over collective rights) embedded in the Charter ofRights and Freedoms, 
Québec society has a rather different mode! of a liberal society, that is, society which can be 
organized around a definition of the good life (collective goals), without this being seen as a 
depreciation of th ose who do not personally share this definition. 
In this master thesis we have studied that the problem with Trudeau's thought of 
universal individualism lies in that he sought to enforce only the abstract contents of 
universal individualistic rights. For, how we materialize rights of individuals and to what 
extent we should ensure the effectiveness of their rights depend on discussions in social 
groups wh ich are deeply concemed in enforcement oftheir rights. 
In reality, the problem at issue in the conflict over the entrenchment of the Canadian 
Charter between Canada and Québec was not the opposition between individual rights and 
collective rights but the different conceptions of rights. Conceming contents of rights and a 
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means of actualization of their rights, Lévesque argued as follows. Rights are changeable 
over time and thus should not be fixed in one point oftime. Lévesque considered the rights of 
each individual to participate in the making of these own rights as such, different from the 
individualistic character of these rights. On the other hand, there is the fact th at Québec is a 
special province in respect of language and history. The national assembly of Québec is 
therefore crucial for cultural and social maintenance and development of Québec as a nation. 
Thus, Lévesque considers the rights of each individual in the Québec to decide cultural and 
social development of Québec of the ir own will as collective rights. 
From the preceding arguments, we can conclude that the Taylors dichotomy 1s too 
simple. 
Moreover, the Lévesque' s conception of rights we have clarified in this master thesis 
serves to further arguments on federal institution. The Québec citizen thought of themselves 
as a nation, expressed their demand for the society suitable for themselves and legislated for 
this purpose. Clearly, it is a Canada not as a uninational state but multinational state that can 
meet their demand. As we pointed out in the Chapter 1, the asymmetrical federalism as a 
form of multinational state has been to a certain extent remarkable for accommodating 
nations in a state. Today, this type of federalism seems to have had prime significance as the 
alternative to modern uninational state. However, the problem with the asymmetrical 
federalism is that collective rights as the special powers given to a national group may 
conflict with individual rights entrenched in the Canadian Charter. Kymlicka and Taylor 
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sought to wade in this problem. However, the analysis in this master thesis has raised the 
alternative possibility for legitimacy of asymmetrical federalism, different from their 
perspective. 
Here, we would like to restate Taylor' s argument for legitimacy of asymmetrical 
federalism. Wh ile citizens in the rest of Canada are united around the princip le of procedural 
liberalism (a view that individual rights must always come first and must take precedence 
over collective rights) embedded in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Québec society has 
a rather different mode! of a liberal society, that is, a society which can be organized around a 
defmition of the good life. 132 Therefore, there are two incompatible views of liberal society 
in post-Meech Lake Canada. According to him, the way of reunification is that procedural 
liberais in English Canada just have to acknowledge, first, that there are other possible 
models of liberal society and, second, that their francophone cornpatriots wish to live by one 
such alternative.133 That is, English-speaking provinces should recognize this type of society 
through the asymmetrical federalism. The term he uses for this is 'deep diversity' , where the 
way of being a Canadian for French-speaking people in Québec is by their belonging to a 
constituent element of Canada, " la nation québécoise." 134 aylor' s argument for legitimacy 
132 Taylor "Shared and Divergent Values," 173-1 77. 
133 Ibid., 178. 
134 Ibid., 182. 
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makes impression that Québec is completely "collective", and the rest of Canada is 
"procedural and individualistic liberalism". 
ln his book titled "Politics in the Vernacular", Kymlicka criticized Taylor's argument 
on the ground that it considered Québec society as society pursuing communitarian vision of 
common good. However, Kymlicka also could not but admit that the Québec's argument for 
language rights deviate from his liberal norms, namely freedom of individual choice. 
Therefore, Kymlicka sought to justify the asymmetrical federalism on the ground that 
national minority with societal culture has the right to nation-building. According to him, 
because national minority as Québec is the group which has bad a societal culture, that is, 
territorially-concentrated culture, centered on a shared language, national minority has the 
rights to nation-building, different from the immigrant which is the result of a voluntary 
choice. However, he could not solve the problem that the Québec language law may deviate 
from principle of liberal norm. Therefore, he cannot answer adequately the problem that the 
Québec society is still considered as a collectivist society by other Canadians. 
Therefore, in my opinion, Taylor and Kymlicka cannot adequately answer criticisms 
from English Canadians that multinational federalism is a system in favor of the Québécois 
society which has tendency to be collective. 
96 
Our argument in this master thesis would differ from Taylor's and Kymlicka' s arguments 
for the legitimacy of asymmetrical federalism. 135 For, in the Québécois society, the language 
rights are not understood to mean only collective rights, but individual and collective rights, 
that is, rights that an individual and groups made up of individuals claim for the purpose of 
their self-realization. In other words, in Québec society, the collective rights are demanded 
for the purpose of developing individual rights. By considering the Québec society as we 
have stated above, we can find more adequate justification for asymmetrical federalism. 
The perspective that we have tried in this master thesis is one of finding justification for 
asymmetrical federalism through exploring the way of understanding human rights within a 
given society. Therefore, as the next subject of research, we would like to develop this 
perspective by examining the language conflict in Belgium, namely, how Flanders in the 
northern part of Belgium have had asserted their language rights and what kind of influence 
their arguments for rights have bad on the shaping of a multinational federation in Belgium. 
135 Kymlicka criticized the Taylor's argument as follows. 
"Taylor defended Québec's sign law on the grounds that it involved only a minor deviation 
from liberal norms in arder to enable Quebecers to pursue their distinctly communitarian 
vision of the common good. In reality, Quebecers are no more communitarian than other 
Canadians, and do not share a conception of the common good". Will Kymlicka, Politics in 
the Vernacular (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 287-288. 
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